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Opsomming
Die fokus van internasionale verkiesingwaarneming het in die loop van die laaste
drie dekades wesenlik verskuif van die tradisionele dekolonisasie
verkiesingskonteks, na waarneming binne onafhanklike state waar die
omskakeling van outoritêre na demokratiese regeringsvorms redelik onlangs
plaasgevind het. Laasgenoemde state moes waarnemers, en die verkiesings wat
waargeneem is, met voorbehoud aanvaar. Die alternatiewe was egter beperk.
Die val van die voormalige Oosblok en die gevolglike triomf van die liberale
demokrasie, het ondemokratiese state met 'n eenvoudige keuse gelaat: hervorm
of staar isolasie in die gesig.
Pro-demokratiese groepe in voormalige outoritêre state het die nuwe klimaat van
politieke vryheid verwelkom. In die besef dat nuwe demokrasieë waarskynlik nie
oor die nodige ervaring en wedersydse vertroue binne die bevolking beskik om
verkiesings volkome te laat vlot nie, is buitelandse bystand - met inbegrip van
internasionale waarneming - deur dié groepe verwelkom. In die afgelope dekade
het die positiewe konnotasie aan internasionale verkiesingswaarneming egter in
gedrang gekom. Drie kernredes hiervoor was die skynbare gebrek aan
universele verkiesingstandaarde, swak georganiseerde waarnemer afvaardigings
en 'n algemene gebrek om hul motiewe bo verdenking te plaas.
Die sentrale oogmerk van hierdie werkstuk is die evaluasie van die bydraes
gemaak deur internasionale verkiesingswaarnemers in die twee Suid-Afrikaanse
verkiesings van 1994 en 1999. Op 'n teoretiese vlak is die drie bogenoemde
gebreke aangespreek, en na raadpleging van internasionale literatuur oor die
onderwerp is drie teenmaatreëls geidentifiseer. Hierdie aktiwiteite, gemik op
meer effektiewe internasionale betrokkenheid bestaan uit: 1) groter aandag wat
geskenk moet word aan politeke konteks; 2) die kombinering van internasionale
waarnemer vaardighede vir beter resultate, en 3) groter klem wat gelê moet word
op samewerking tussen nasionale en internasionale waarnemers. Elkeen van
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hierdie vereistes is oorgedra na die Suid-Afrikaanse verkiesingskonteks om vas
te stel tot watter mate dié gebruike in Suid-Afrika wortel geskied het.
Wat betref die eerste voorstel met betrekking tot konteksgebonde evaluasie, is
daar vasgestel dat dit wel deel was van internasionale waarnemer praktyk in
beide verkiesings. 'n Waardeskatting van die koordinasie van internasionale
waarnemingsgroepe dui verder daarop dat samewerking tussen
waarnemergroepe oor die algemeen bygedra het tot 'n versterking van
inisiatiewe deur internasionalewaarnemers. Op hierdie gebied het die Verenigde
Nasies veral 'n sleutelrol gespeel. 'n Aspek wat egter agterweë gebly het, is die
vlak van samewerking tussen internasionale waarnermers en hul Suid-
Afrikaanse eweknieë. Hier is 'n waardevolle geleentheid verspeelom die
kapasiteit van plaaslike verkiesingswaarnemers te versterk. Dit, en die feit dat
toekomstige internasionale teenwoordigheid in die toekoms nie 'n sekerheid is
nie, sal volgens die skrywer, beteken dat Suid-Afrikaners in die toekoms
toenemend aangewese sal wees op die ontwikkeling van eie kapasiteit. In die lig
hiervan moet inisiatiewe soos SAOG se nuutgestigte Verkiesingsforum
verwelkom en aangemoedig word.
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Abstract
Over the past three decades the practice of international election observation has
shifted its focus from elections taking place within a decolonialisation context, to
those in independent, but formerly undemocratic, states. The latter accepted the
presence of international observers with some reservation, citing the contention
that observation amounted to an infringement on national sovereignty. The
demise of the former East Block, however, established the primacy of the liberal
democratic ideology in world politics, leaving these states with a limited choice
between democratisation and isolation.
Pro-democracy supporters in former authoritarian countries embraced the
change in ideological climate. Realising the lack of capacity and trust to run
elections by themselves, they generally supported the presence of international
observers in elections of states emerging from prolonged periods of
authoritarianism. Over the past decade this affinity with international missions
has been transformed into skepticism. Three primary reasons for this
disenchantment have been the apparent lack of electoral standards,
uncoordinated observer missions and failure to convince voters of their
impartiality.
This assignment represents a scholarly attempt to evaluate the contributions of
international election observers to South African elections. On a theoretical level
it addresses the three criticisms against foreign observation. Drawing on the vast
body of international literature, the author suggests three countermeasures.
These suggestions, aimed at enhancing the contributions of international
observer consist of: 1) a greater consideration for the political context within
which an election takes place; 2) the pooling of international observer capacity
and 3) more scope to, and cooperation with, local observer groups. Each of
these measures is transferred to the South African electoral reality to establish
the extent of their application in this practical context.
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been given to contextual factors in both elections. An assessment of the quality
of coordination of international observer groups also indicates that the practice of
pooling resources have been employed with success by a number of missions. In
this field the U.N. played a leading role. Cooperation between international
observers and their local counterparts is however an aspect that has been
lagging behind. The opportunity for capacity building, a significant benefit of
such cooperation, has therefore to a large extent been lost. In the light of this,
and the uncertainty of future international involvement, the author asserts that in
future South Africans will increasingly be dependent on the cultivation of
homegrown capacity. He therefore believes that initiatives such as the creation of
the SADC Electoral Forum in 1998 are commendable and should be
encouraged.
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1CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1. BACKGROUND
Following the example of other recently democratised countries, South Africa
invited a large contingent of international election observers to attest to the
smooth conduct of its first democratic elections in 1994. It was the appropriate
thing to do at the time. Newly democratised countries were expected to exhibit
their democratic credentials to the international community. Without them they
were destined for an existence on the periphery of the post-Cold War liberal
democratic world order.
It would be safe to say that as far as international acceptance goes, South
Africa has made the grade. Far from being the pariah that it was under the
apartheid regime, the country has become a respected member of the
international community of nations. This is underscored by the active, and
often leading role, it plays within a vast number of international organisations.
Why then, can it be asked, was it necessary for international observers to be
present again during the country's second general elections? Although fewer
in numbers and with diminished status than the first time around, once again
careful attention was given to findings of foreign observer groups at the
conclusion of the election. It may be argued that when a country has proved
itself once, any further foreign involvement in elections will amount to an insult
to the particular country's sovereign right to self-determination. What are
South Africans therefore to make of international scrutiny of their second
general election?
To value this practice only for its legitimatising function to those outside
national borders, would, however, render an incomplete assessment. The
body of international literature with regard to the topic of international election
observation suggests that it entails more than putting an international stamp
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
2of approval on an election. It also has a key developmental function to fulfil in
the legitimisation of democracy to potential voters within the observed country
itself. Since most instances of international election observation occur within
developing countries with little or no prior experience of conducting elections,
foreign observers have the ability to make important contributions with regard
to the creation and support of both democratic values and instances. A review
of their accomplishments in South Africa should consequently take
cognisance of the legitim ising role international observers have played in the
international community, but very importantly also their service to electorate of
the relevant country.
2. RESEARCH QUESTION
As has been stated in the above section, international legitimacy of both
South Africa's general elections has been established. This paper will rather
concern itself with the latter of the two prerequisites. What contribution, if any,
have international election observers made to the strengthening of the
electoral process within South Africa?
Literature on this topic is hard to come by. Anglin's account of the 1994
election observation effort has probably been the most thorough to emerge in
the wake of these this historic election.' Although presenting a comprehensive
evaluation, the fact that this was a first election prevented him to draw any
comparisons with local precedents. He was, therefore, largely dependent on
accounts of elections that have taken place abroad in comparable political
contexts. The 1999 election provided scholars with the first opportunity to
compare South African observer efforts with one another. Following the
example of Anglin, the author intends to provide an account of the 1999
international observation effort. By comparing the two efforts, he, however,
hopes to go one step further in providing an assessment of the achievements
of this practice within a South African context.
IAnglin, D. 1995: International Monitoring of the Transition to Democracy in South Africa,
1992-1994 African Affairs p. 522.
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3Although many intergovernmental and international nongovernmental
organisations have already made - and are still making - significant
contributions to the larger project of democratic consolidation, the paper will
specifically concentrate on elections as one of its most important constituent
parts. The focus of questions to be asked will centre on the nature and
conduct of the observer missions themselves, as well as on their interaction
with local democratic structures participating in the conduct of the elections.
It is the feeling of the author that the international community still has a role to
play in South African elections. To what extent their assistance will be
required in future elections is difficult to tell at this stage. Variables like
economic growth and political development will have an impact one way or
another.
For the sake of clarity it has to be noted that a scholarly distinction is being
made between election observation, and election monitoring. These terms are
sometimes used interchangeably, which is technically incorrect. Observation
refers to a passive role played by international observers in watching,
evaluating, and reporting on matters pertaining to an election. Monitoring on
the other hand refers to active participation, where the role of observer is
combined with activities such as guidance, instruction and assistance." Both
mandates for international electoral assistance in South Africa were limited to
observation.
3. AIM AND VALUE OF THE STUDY
The central aim of this study would be to provide an overview of the
accomplishments of international observation missions in South Africa's two
post-apartheid general elections. An opportunity is provided to look back and
ascertain the number and nature of the contributions that were made.
2Geldenhuys, D. 1998: Foreign Political Engagement: Remaking States in the Cold War
World New York: St. Martin's Press p. 92.
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4The practice of international election observation has become too sensitive an
issue to approach in a haphazard manner. Recent opposition to international
observer groups in East-Timor, and the dismal failure of observation groups in
Angola's 1992 elections, serve as a stark reminder of this fact. It is therefore
hoped that this study will be able to provide a recommendation for the need
for future missions, and if indeed the case, what the nature of it should be.
4. RATIONALE
Robert Pastor remarks that in the period 1990-99, 81 elections were reported
as being flawed.' The grounds for their failure are numerous, but his analysis
shows that at the heart of each there was one common denominator:
administrative problems incurred by electoral authorities.
Most recently democratised countries in the developing world share these
administrative shortcomings. Two factors, however, stand out above the rest.
A shortage of funds to conduct a proper election is a first important drawback
that hampers the effective conduct of elections. Secondly, and maybe most
importantly, the experience needed to coordinate a project of this magnitude
is lacking in most of these countries. Exacerbating the situation is the high
level of political polarisation present in most of these societies. Since the
stakes are so high, political parties and their supporters may interpret
administrative shortfalls that may put them at a disadvantage as orchestrated
by the incumbent regime. If left unresolved, such a situation might derail a
whole election campaign.
In the run-up to the June 1999 elections, Idasa, Markinor and the South
African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) conducted the Opinion 99 Surveys
on a number of issues that could potentially have had an impact on the final
results. Of specific interest to this paper, is the survey conducted on a number
3Pastor, R. 1999: The Role of Administration in Democratic Transitions: Implications for Policy
and Research Democratization Vol. 6 No.4
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5of matters relating to trust in electoral institutions. Even though the majority of
respondents indicated their trust in the Independent Electoral Commission
(IEC), a substantial percentage (24%) voiced opinions ranging from suspicion
to distrust in IEC's ability to administer an impartial election campaign."
Interesting differences in opinion about the IEC run almost exclusively along
racial lines, with whites (58%) having the least trust, followed by Indians
(47%), Coloureds (35%) and blacks (16%). These results also confirm earlier
findings by Mattes and Thiel that opinions on issues that can be used to
indicate levels of democratic consolidation, can be clearly differentiated in
terms of race." From the above it can be asserted that pre-election attitudes
indicate that more needs to be done to foster trust in the IEC.
Nongovernmental organisations have an important role to play in the fostering
of a functional democratic infrastructure. With their roots anchored in local
communities they provide a valuable link between institutions promoting
democracy and the populace that needs to be convinced of its merits. One
important contribution that they can make, and in many instances do make, is
their participation in domestic election observation efforts. An important
condition for election observation, as will be indicated in this assignment, is
however observer impartiality, a requirement that is often hard to satisfy. In
politically divided societies these groups will enjoy the trust of those opposing
the incumbent regime. It is, however, the latter and its supporters that need to
be convinced of the impartiality of local observer groups. In many recently
democratised countries, NGO's stood at the forefront of campaigns against
policies of incumbent governments and it is, therefore, doubtful that these
regimes will accept their findings without reservation. This scenario can also
be likened to the relationship between civil society and political parties in
South Africa. Traditionally South African civil society has stood closer to the
ANC and its partners in the liberation struggle than to the former Nationalist
41DASA, 1999: Opinion 99 Survey: Trust in Electoral Institutions
http://www.idasa.org.za/pos/op99/op99 _no22htm
5Mattes R. and Thiel, H. 1997: "Consolidation and Public Opinion in South Africa" Journal of
Democracy Vol. 9(1)
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6government. One possible solution to counter reservations with regard to
observer partiality is to invite international observers to observe elections
alongside local observers. Should they confirm the findings of local groups,
greater credibility is given to local efforts.
5. METHODOLOGY
This is a comparative study aimed at establishing the extent to which South
African elections have benefited from the presence of international observers
in both its democratic general elections.
A substantial body of international literature with regard to the experiences of
observer missions elsewhere in the world will be consulted to establish
whether there are any common threads running through all of them. This will
be supplemented by unstructured questionnaires to observer groups and
interviews where possible. Key questions that will be asked with regard to this
first section are: What is the underlying rationale for the use of international
observers? When should they be deployed, and what are their primary
functions. From responses to these questions the author would like to distil a
number of conditions that will serve as criteria for the efficient conduct of
international observer missions. He envisages that these conditions will most
probably centre on the three recurring themes in the consulted literature: a)
electoral standards, b) observer conduct and c) the coordination of
international observer activities.
Once specific conditions have been extracted from the above themes, the
author will proceed to apply them to the activities of international observers in
the two recent elections. Literature with regard to both elections, as well as
interviews with the IEC, scholars and local observer groups will be used to get
a better understanding of the South African experience with foreign missions.
The primary focus of this second section will be to identify the role that they
have played in each of the elections respectively. In conclusion, a judgement
will have to be made with regard to their contribution so far, but also about the
desirability of future contributions to the South African electoral process.
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76. CHAPTER SEQUENCE
The assignment will consist of five chapters. A number of introductory
comments will be provided in the first chapter, which will be followed by
chapters two and three that will relate to the broad theory and practice of
international election observation. Chapter four will be an analysis of foreign
observer activities in the past two general elections, while the final chapter will
contain a number of recommendations for future use. The following is a short
summary of the content of each.
Chapter 1
A general outlay of the paper is provided. The research question is stated, an
explanation of the aim and value of the study is provided, the rationale for
conducting the study is established, and is supported by the underlying
assumptions of the author. In addition matters relating to the methodology and
scheduling of the paper are addressed.
Chapter 2
Chapter 2 covers the recent history of the practice of international election
observation, and explains the emphasis placed on elections as a measure of
democratic reform. Finally it introduces the reader to the types of
organisations that conduct election observation and the functions that they
perform.
Chapter 3
The sensitive question of foreign intervention is touched upon in Chapter 3. A
justification for its existence is provided. It is stated that objections have
recently been coming from pro-democracy campaigners within observed
countries themselves. Three of the main objections are stated, as well as
responses to them. Finally a number of conditions are identified for the
smooth conduct of foreign electoral missions.
Chapter 4
Chapter 4 takes the conditions that were identified in the previous chapter and
apply them to the experience of observer missions in South Africa. An
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8assessment will be given on the efficiency of their participation in the past two
elections.
Chapter 5
Concluding remarks and a number of recommendations will be made in the
final chapter. Views on the desirability of future missions will be expressed.
7. KEYWORDS AND PHRASES
Key words to be used in this study will be:
international observers, foreign observers, domestic observers, free and fair
elections, democratic consolidation
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter provided an outline of the objective and motivation for engaging
the chosen topic. It consists of three main components. Firstly it contained a
statement of the research question that was to be addressed in this paper. It
was pointed out that the central concern of this paper would be to ascertain
the achievements of international observers in South Africa's two democratic
elections.
The second important element of Chapter 1 was the provision of a rationale
for the study to be conducted. Cultivating a democratic culture and a trust in
the institutions that promote it, are not something that can be accomplished
overnight. In the opinion of the author the contributions of international
observers during elections can assist in the building of capacity and trust in
local electoral processes. The rationale of this study is, therefore, to
determine whether this can be said of observation efforts in South African
elections.
A last important component of the first chapter has been the methodological
approach to the paper. Although international literature has been reviewed in
Chapters 2 and 3, very few comparisons were made between the international
and South African experiences in election observation. International literature
has rather been used to extract a number of good electoral practices that the
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9author argues should be applied by observer missions in South African
elections. The nature is of this paper is therefore essentially descriptive, rather
than comparative.
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CHAPTER 2
International Election Observation - An International
Overview
1. INTRODUCTION
Foreign assistance in domestic elections is by no means a phenomenon
peculiar to the last two and a half decades of this century. Since the advent of
decolonisation in Africa, the United Nations (UN) and other inter-governmental
organisations (IGOs) were involved in facilitating the process of transition from
dependent colonies to independent states. By the mid-eighties, most African
territories had severed their ties with their former colonial masters. This did,
however, not signal the end of the conduct of electoral observation. Especially
in the last two decades of the twentieth century, it also became a common
phenomenon in independent states.
This involvement by inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations
in domestic elections coincided with what Huntington has coined the "Third
Wave of Democratisation"." This term referred to the democratisation process
that had started in Portugal in 1974 and since swept through Eastern Europe,
Latin America, and specifically the African continent. The conclusion of the
Cold War speeded up this process, and by the late nineties democracy had
become the most prevalent political system on the globe. Countries that are
not democratic, or are in the process of democratising, are experiencing ever
growing international pressure to implement the appropriate reforms. It has
become the norm to link the granting of development aid and loans to the
extent of democratic reform that has taken place within formerly authoritarian
countries. Undemocratic African countries with their weak economic
predisposition were especially vulnerable to this new world order. The
inevitability of democratic reform had become a given factor, and no longer
were countries able to rely on the financial assistance afforded to them due to
6 Huntington, S.P. 1993: The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century
Oklahoma University Press p. 3.
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their strategic importance during the Cold War. By the mid-1990s the great
majority of African countries have conducted either founding or second
elections to demonstrate their commitment to democratic values.
These elections would, however, have been useless if they were not
witnessed and legitimised by the international community which in the first
instance insisted on them taking place. Without an international blessing, their
lack of international legitimacy would have kept authoritarian states out in the
cold. Not only did they experience an external legitimacy crisis, but also
opposition groups within their own borders did not trust them to conduct the
pending elections in an acceptable fashion. Required therefore were impartial
observers who enjoyed the trust of both the international and relevant local
communities. For this purpose the practice of international election
observation was revived in its new guise.
What has distinguished the new course of foreign electoral participation from
that of its predecessor has been the fact that for the first time electoral
assistance has taken place within the boundaries of formally independent
countries. 7 As the democratisation process gained momentum in the late
eighties and early nineties, observers from international organisations were
increasingly being invited to observe elections in formerly authoritarian states.
This sharp increase in observation missions gave rise to what Anglin calls "an
international monitoring industry"."
In addition to the "legitimacy" that they provided to the electoral process, the
presence of international election observers also brought with them technical
skills and experience which were needed to assist domestic electoral
commissions and observer groups in creating the required democratic
infrastructure within which elections could take place.
7 Chand, VK 1997: Democratisation from the outside in: NGO and international efforts to
promote open elections Third World Quarterly Vol. 18, NO.3 p. 543.
8 Anglin, D. 1998: International Election Monitoring: The African Experience African Affairs
No. 97 p. 471.
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The question must, however, be posed whether the conduct of elections is
sufficient proof of a country's commitment to democratic ideals. How much
importance should be attached to it as a measure of democratic reform? If the
answer to this is 'little' or 'none', the international community's focus on
elections as a yardstick of democratisation has been completely misplaced.
These issues will be addressed in the following section.
2. ELECTIONS AS A MEASURE OF DEMOCRATIC REFORM
The questions stated in the above paragraph hinge on the issue of democratic
consolidation. For the purpose of this discussion, the most common
conceptualisation of democratic consolidation, i.e. "the widespread
acceptance of the rules to guarantee political participation and political
competition," will be employed."
By their very nature elections promote both these norms, but, according to
Bratton, there is little consensus on the exact role they play within the
consolidation process." There are essentially two lines of thought on the
issue: one that subscribes to a minimalist understanding of democracy, using
electoral criteria, and another more substantialist view which maintains that
elections in and by themselves cannot be used to make judgements on the
state of a democracy. By means of his "two turnover test", Huntington 11
subscribes to the former school of thought by using electoral criteria, whereas
Karl12 aligns herself with the latter by rejecting such a practice as the "fallacy
of electoralism", pointing to "illiberal" democracies where elections coexist
with a continuous trampling of political rights and the disenfranchisement of
large sections of the population.
9 Bratton, M. 1998: Second Elections in Ati"ica Journal of Democracy Vol 9, No 3 p. 51.
10 See Braton 1998, p. 51,
11 See Huntington 1993, p. 266
12Karl, T.L. 1986: Imposing Consent: Electoralism and Democratisation in EI Salvador in
Drake, P. and Silva, S. eds. Elections and Democratisation in Latin America 1980-1985
La Jolla: University of California San Diego Press p. 9-36
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Bratton chooses to take an approach, which can be regarded as a middle
road between the two extremes. While acknowledging that the occurrence of
elections do not by themselves consolidate democracies, he nevertheless
maintains that elections remain fundamental not merely to the instalment of
democratic government, but even more so as a prerequisite for broader
democratic consolidation." The regularity, openness, and acceptability of
elections can indeed be used as indicators of whether basic constitutional,
behavioural and attitudinal foundations have been laid down during the interim
periods. "If nothing else," Bratton states, " the convening of scheduled multi-
party elections serves the minimal function of marking democracy's
survival."!" This view is echoed by Breytenbach, who contends that even
though an election might not be proof enough of democratic consolidation
within a country, the symbolism attached to it can lay a powerful foundation
for the institutional foundations that will enhance democratic development."
The view taken by Bratton and Breytenbach (which the author subscribes to)
thus recognises that one election does not a democracy make. They
nevertheless believe that the analysis and observation of an election can be a
significant indicator of the extent that democratic consolidation has taken
place.
Conducting observation that can provide an accurate indication of satisfactory
electoral conduct is, nevertheless, easier said than done. Many factors play
into a specific context and therefore require different levels of observer
involvement. In the following section the diversified network of observation
groups and their activities, which evolved as a result of these multi-level
requirements, will be discussed.
13 See Braton 1998, p. 52.
14 See Braton 1998, p. 52.
15 Breytenbach, W.J. 1996: Democratisation in Africa: Transitions, Elections and
Prospects for Consolidation Ndabeni: Rustica Press p. 57.
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3. OBSERVER BODIES AND THE CATEGORIES OF ASSISTANCE THEY
PROVIDE
Functions that can be performed by international observers will in most
instances depend on the nature of the organisation they are affiliated to. The
main distinction to be made with regard to organisations participating in
international election observation is that between intergovernmental
organisations (IGas) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This
section will contain a discussion of these two categories and the functions
they fulfil within the context of international electoral assistance.
3.1 IntergovernmentalOrganisations
3.1.1 The United Nations
The UN is by far the best resourced of all IGOs participating in the practice of
election observation. Its financial muscle, its track record of more than four
decades in the observation "business", and most significantly, its political
clout, has made it the leading election observation organisation. According to
Beigbeder an analysis of UN electoral assistance can best be done by
drawing a distinction between first generation and second generation electoral
assistance."
First generation assistance was first provided in the post Second World War
era, shortly after the UN came into being. Its initial focus was on assistance to
the two divided countries of Germany and Korea, and later on to former trust
territories and countries that were in the transition process from colonialism to
independence. The single objective of these first missions was to observe
electoral processes and to report the mission's findings to the authorising U.N.
body." With the exception of Germany and Korea, none of these missions
conducted election observation in sovereign states. The UN's participation in
"first generation" elections was relatively low-key, with the number of
16 Beigbeder, Y. 1994: International Monitoring of Plebiscites, Referenda and National
Elections: Self-determination and Transition to Democracy Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers p.120
17SeeBeigbeder 1994 p.120
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observers per country rarely exceeding more than thirty persons." According
to Beigbeder this was one of the major shortcomings of early electoral
assistance units. The size of the missions, he asserts, considerably limited the
scope and the extent of the actual fulfilment of their observation tasks."
Other than first generation electoral assistance, second generation assistance
by the U.N., has primarily occurred within independent countries. The cases
of Namibia and Western Sahara are two exceptions. Another distinguishing
trademark of the U.N.'s second-generation assistance has been its
participation in larger, more complex operations than in the past." A more
holistic approach has been taken not only to ensure that the events on
election day run smoothly, but - if required - also to create those conditions
that will enhance peaceful and acceptable elections. In the case of Namibia,
the UN was responsible for overseeing the entire electoral process. In most
other countries, UN electoral assistance comprised different variations and
combinations of assistance activities that have transpired from observation
efforts over the past four decades."
For technical purposes the UN distinguishes between two main categories of
assistance. The first is known as "standard electoral assistance activities" that
refer to all forms of small-scale technical assistance activities that do not
require a specific mandate from the General Assembly or the Security
Council. On request from a member state where an election is to take place,
the following types of standard assistance can be provided to enhance an
electoral process. (In most instances, however, the need to adapt strategies
to the specific environment gives rise to a synergy of two or more activities.)
The co-ordination and support of international election observers: This form of
assistance is generally employed where several organisations have been
invited by a member state to observe an election. Under such circumstances,
18See Beigbeder 1994, p.120.
19See Beigbeder 1994, p.120.
20See Beigbeder 1994, p.148.
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the UN would establish a small secretariat in the requesting country that will
help to co-ordinate and provide logistical support to the various observer
groups.22 Together these organisations that fall under the U.N. umbrella
comprise joint international observer groups (JIOGs). JIOGs is one of the
fastest growing forms of electoral assistance in countries that are conducting
their own elections. For observer groups it has become far more cost effective
to be part of a JIOG. The management function provided by the U.N. ensures
the optimal deployment of observers and thereby avoids the duplication of
services. Most importantly, JIOGs develop as far as possible a commonly
agreed upon purpose and terms of reference for all observers participating
under the auspices of the U.N. 23The fact that there is sufficient consensus on
the yardsticks to be used for evaluating an election, allows the JIOG to issue
a joint statement on the conduct of an election at its conclusion.
It should, however, be recognised that among observer groups there is a
diverse range of reasons and approaches to election observation, which in
most instances will always require that they maintain a fair amount of
institutional independence. For this reason some organisations participating in
JIOG's will issue a separate statements apart from that of the JIOG to explain
their findings in more detail" To illustrate this point Anglin observes that the
Organisation for African Unity (OAU) has only recently become less reticent
about committing itself publicly to the joint statements of JIOG's.25
Technical Assistance: Requests for technical assistance in the conduct of
elections is the most popular form of assistance provided by the U.N. to its
member states." Depending on the requests of national election authorities,
21 United Nations EAD: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/docs/website3.htm 23/7/1999
22 See Anglin 1998, p. 486.
23 IDEA, 1995: International Election Observation: Seventeen organizations share
experiences on electoral observation Stockholm: IDEA p. 20.
24See Anglin 1998, p. 486
25See Anglin 1998, p. 486
26Mair, S. 1997: Election Observation: Roles and Responsibilities of Long-term Election
Observers ECDPM: http://www.oneworld.org/ecdpm/pubs/wp22_gb.htm14/6/1999
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assistance can be provided on either a long-term or short-term basis. The
range of assistance activities provided by the U.N. and its subsidiary bodies
includes assistance and/or advice on planning elections, voter registration,
election budgeting, review of electoral laws and regulations, training of
election officials, logistics, voter education, electoral dispute resolution,
computerisation of electoral rolls and boundary delimitation."
Support for Domestic Observers: The empowerment of domestic observers to
conduct election observation is one of the most significant, though less
emphasised, contributions that the U.N. can make to the future consolidation
of democratic institutions within member states. This form of assistance is
provided on request from the host country and is usually made available to a
national network of observer groups, sponsored by local non-partisan, civic
orqanisations." As will be indicated in the following chapter, the importance
of civil societies participation in the electoral process cannot be
overemphasised. Domestic observers, if properly organised and prepared,
hold several advantages over international observers. Not only can they be
mobilised in much larger numbers, but also have the advantage of being
acquainted with the physical territory, the languages of the region, as well as
the political culture. Because they are citizens of the country, their presence
reinforces the idea that their country is willing and able to take responsibility
for the wellbeing of its political process."
Limited Observation ("Follow and Report"): In extraordinary circumstances the
U.N. will send a small team of observers to follow the final phase of an
electoral process and issue an internal report to the Secretary-General on its
conduct." Financial constraints have made it increasingly difficult for the UN
to send large observer missions to member states. It can be argued that
27See United Nations EAD: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/docs/website3.htm 23/27/1999
28SeeUnited Nations EAD: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/docs/website3.htm 23/27/1999
29Carothers, T. 1997: The Rise of Election Monitoring: Observers Observed Journal of
Democracy Vol 8 No 3, p. 26.
30See United Nations EAD: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/docs/website3.htm 23/7/1999
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limited observation only serves the purpose of providing moral
encouragement and support to a democratic transition.
"Major electoral missions," the second main category of electoral assistance,
are provided in circumstances that the U.N. considers being exceptional. The
green light for these missions can only be given if it is backed up by a
mandate from the Security Councilor the General Assembly. These missions
form in most instances the important electoral component of larger, more
comprehensive peacekeeping operations." The following activities can be
regarded as falling in the category major electoral missions:
Organisation and Conduct of an Electoral Process: In this extraordinary form
of electoral assistance the U.N. is being mandated to assume the duties
generally afforded to a national electoral authority. The functions that are
afforded to these missions may include the establishment of a system of laws
governing the process, procedures and administrative measures necessary to
conduct an election in an acceptable fashion, and the administration of the
actual election process." The enormous cost, scope and amount of time
required to develop custom-made electoral infrastructures, make this form of
assistance very rare. The only conditions under which it is likely to be applied
is where an election is to take place in post-conflict societies, characterised by
insufficient national institutional capacity to organise elections. The large role
that the U.N. played in Namibia's liberation election of 1989, is an example of
this extraordinary type of electoral assistance. Its duties ranged from the
organisation and planning of the elections to the observation and verification
thereof. In addition it was also responsible for peacekeeping, protection of
human rights and the general promotion of democratic values within Namibian
society."
31See United Nations EAD: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/docs/website3.htm 23/7/1999
32See Beigbeder 1994 p.120.
33SeeBeigbeder 1994 p.120.
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Supervision of an Electoral Process: Just as exceptional is the UN practice of
supervising an electoral process. For the larger part of its existence
supervision has been conducted within the context of decolonisation and
hence its rarity as a current instrument of electoral observation. It require that
all phases of the electoral process - be this political or electoral - have to be
certified, and not only the results of the election itself.34 The sensitive and
complex nature of such a mission usually requires that preparatory a mission
visit the member state to discuss the various aspects that need to be
supervised. These components will include aspects such as the registration
process, the impartiality of the national electoral commission, the freedom of
organisation and movement of all parties, equal access to the media and all
other matters relating to the organisation of the poll, the campaign, the
counting and the announcement of the results."
Verification of an Electoral Process: A more commonly used practice in the
category of major election missions is that of verification. The electoral
process is organised and administered by the national election authority, while
the UN is asked to verify the acceptability of all aspects of the process. U.N.
verification missions have no legally binding powers, but are authorized to
verify the various stages of the election process and the compliance of the
national electoral authority with the electoral regulations. According to
Beigbeder, the terms of reference for verification are very similar to those
pertaining to supervision. The major difference, he points out, lies in the fact
that the former takes place in sovereign states, while the latter does not. A
very recent example is South Africa's 1994 elections, where the U.N. was
specifically required to conduct the verification of each phase of the election
process.
The rate at which democratisation has taken place since the late eighties has
forced the U.N. to rethink the nature of its participation in electoral assistance
programmes. The increased demand for a U.N. presence had the effect of
34See Beigbeder 1994 p. 111.
35See Beigbeder 1994 p. 111.
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putting the organisation's human and financial resources under severe strain.
With its aim to provide a more efficiently managed observation service, the
U.N. established its Electoral Assistance Division (EAD) in 1992. The division
is run by a small staff of electoral experts who work in close co-operation with
other UN agencies, IGOs and NGOs. Its main functions are to evaluate
government requests for electoral assistance, conducting needs assessment
missions, and collaborating with other U.N. system agencies in the design of
electoral assistance. In addition it also provides training and logistical support
to international observer groups.36
In the light of budgetary constraints, the EAD has limited its operations to the
provision of electoral verification in the context of peacekeeping, and the co-
ordination and support of various international observer groups in the form of
JIOG's.37 The organisation no longer deploys large groups of observers on a
routine basis, but in some instances it will still send a small number of
observers to "follow and report" on an election. As will be indicated in the
following chapter, the EAD has also drawn up a list of criteria to which a
member state has to adhere before assistance can be provided. The primary
aim of this list is to ensure that funds are not wasted on countries where either
the goodwill of the organisation will be abused or where the basic conditions
for holding elections are nonexistent.
3.1.2 The Commonwealth
The Commonwealth is not a typical intergovernmental organisation. It consists
out of a loose amalgamation of former British colonies and has no constitution
or charter, no constitutional structure, and it does not impose statutory
obligations on its members."
Already in 1971 the Commonwealth adopted its Declaration of
Commonwealth Principles, which contained a strong pro-democracy
36See United Nations EAD: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/docs/website3.htm 23/27/1999
37See Anglin 1998, p. 474.
38 See Beigbeder 1994 p. 224.
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content." This is significant in the light of the fact that a large number of
Commonwealth members were at that stage one-party states or military
governments.
Like the U.N. the Commonwealth had previous experience of election
observation during the decolonisation era, but never formally subscribed to it
as a measure to render electoral assistance in sovereign states. When its
Heads of Government met in Kuala Lumpur in 1989, to strategise on the
organisation's course for the nineties, it was decided that henceforth the
organisation should playa more prominent role in the promotion of democracy
within member states." It was further agreed upon to provide Commonwealth
observer missions on request to members in order to reinforce their election
and constitutional processes. In the Harare Declaration two years later, the
organisation undertook to strengthen its capacity to respond to requests from
members for electoral assistance and to contribute to the entrenchment of
democratic practices and institutions."
In practice the Commonwealth's electoral assistance consists mainly of the
technical assistance, verification and/or observation." Generally its advisory
role is limited and up to now it has not been responsible for the conduct of an
election. Most missions have therefore been small and the size of contingents
usually ranges between four and thirteen observers." The Commonwealth
also participates in democratic capacity-building programmes by contributing
to the strengthening of institutions which sustain democracy and the civil
service.
3.1.3 The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
39The Commonwealth, 1992: "The Evolution of the Modern Commonwealth" Commonwealth
Yearbook 1991
40See Beigbeder 1994 p. 238.
41See Beigbeder 1994 p. 238.
42Anyaoku, E. 1996: The Commonwealth and the New Liberation
http://www.tcol.co.uklsecgen.htm 2/9/1999
43See Beigbeder 1994 p. 239.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
22
The OSCE, or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) as it was known at its establishment in 1972, has since its inception in
1973 subscribed to the principle of respect for human rights. Its founding
charter did, however, not contain any reference to democracy as the preferred
political system for its member states. It was only at a summit of the
organisation in Paris in 1990, that it decided to adopt the principle of
democratic governance in member states." Earlier that same year in
Copenhagen at a meeting on the Human Dimension of the OSCE (then
CSCE), the need was impressed upon members to consider the advantages
of having present both international and domestic observers at general
elections.
The Paris Summit also saw the establishment of an Office for Free Elections,
which progressively was given more responsibilities, and eventually led to its
name change of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(ODIHR).45 Its tasks included facilitating and exchanging information on
elections, the organisation of democracy related seminars and the
establishment of contacts with NGOs. Its main function however became the
monitoring of elections. Its broad membership, according to Prins and
WOrzner, had put the OSCE in the ideal position of taking charge of the
coordination of election monitoring at a stage when a vast number of the
former East Block countries were in the transition process from
authoritarianism to democracy."
3.1.5 Other IGOs
Many other regional and transregional IGOs have recently become actively
involved in promoting democratic values mainly in their member states, but in
some exceptional cases also abroad. Like the U.N. their main contribution has
come in the form of providing observer missions and technical assistance to
countries which have national elections.
44See Beigbeder 1994 p. 256.
45 Prins, D. and Wlirzner, H. 1996: Transition or Tradition? The United Nations, OSeE and
Electoral Assistance Helsinki Monitor Vol. 7 No 4, p. 32.
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Like the Commonwealth, la Francophonie is focussing in on democratic
reform in former French colonies. The EU also makes use of its influence in
Lomé Convention countries, like the OAU in African countries. Sub-regional
bodies such as the Economic Community of East African States (ECOWAS)
and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are also
becoming involved in election monitoring on the African continent."
Specifically of interest to Southern Africa, is SADC's drive to establish a
professional electoral assistance infrastructure. The Electoral Institute of
South Africa (EISA) is coordinating the work of SADC electoral commissions
forum. The main motivation behind this endeavour is to build the necessary
capacity within SADC to observe each other's elections says David Pottie, a
senior researcher at the institute." In 1999 there will be five elections within
SADC member countries, and according to Pottie, it will be the aim of EISA to
coordinate SADC observer missions in all them.
3.2 Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs)
As has been stated in the above section, the UN with its greater financial,
organisational and technical resources has major advantages over other
observer bodies. Being bigger does, however, not make it better in all matters
pertaining to election observation.
Since they are small groups with limited resources, most electoral NGOs are
increasingly focussing their attention on specialised niches based on
comparative advantaqe." The International Human Rights Law Group, for
example, specialises in the analysis of election laws, while the International
Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) excels in the provision of electoral
equipment and technical support. Due to their specialised nature, it has
increasingly become American practice to contract observation out to larger
electoral NGOs like the IFES, the National Democratic Institute (NDl), and the
46 See Prins and Wurzner 1996, p. 33.
47 See Anglin 1998, p. 482.
48 Interview with David Pottie
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
24
International Republican Institute (IRI). In practice these larger NGOs prefer to
do their election observation independently. Most of the smaller international
NGOs pool their respective skills in the combined UN-organised observer
missions.
According to Chand, this type of specialisation by NGOs have contributed to
greater pluralism in global society and fostered a much-needed network of co-
operative ties between IGOs and NGOs.5o
4. REPRISE
It has been the objective of this chapter to introduce the reader to the origins,
nature and practitioners of international election observation. It has been
indicated that its roots essentially lie within the context of electoral assistance
provided to former colonies in the wake of the decolonisation period.
Initially IGOs were the primary practitioners of international election
observation. The magnitude of post-colonial elections and the resources
required by observer missions to cover them has made IGOs the obvious
choice to conduct election observation. As the rate of countries democratising
has rapidly increased since the late eighties, it has, however, became
increasingly difficult even for large IGO's like UN to finance their observer
missions. This opened the door for the NGO sector to playa more prominent
role in the field of electoral assistance.
Today international and national NGOs playa significant role in the conduct of
elections. Their value lies in the fact that most are specialising in some aspect
of electoral conduct. This has allowed the UN to perform its new function of
co-ordinating major IGO and NGO missions by means of joint international
observer group (JIOGs). Not only is it a more economical way of observing,
but according to its proponents, it allows for increased efficacy in terms of
reaching as many voting stations as possible.
49 See Chand 1997, p. 548.
50 See Chand 1997, p. 559.
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Many of the abovementioned organisations, both intergovernmental and
nongovernmental, were also active participants in South Africa's 1994 and
1999 electoral processes. The context within which each took place, differed
and therefore also the contributions that were required and provided by
international bodies. This assignment will specifically deal with the nature of
international participation in both elections, and the cumulative effect it had on
South Africa's relatively young democratic infrastructure.
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CHAPTER 3
Major Challenges to International Observation and
Responses Thereto
1. INTRODUCTION
A defining trademark of the new generation of election observer missions has
been the vast majority of observation efforts that have been conducted within
the borders of sovereign states. The foundations for this new focus has been
laid by the global wave of democratisation that has swept over most of the
world's formerly authoritarian countries since the late eighties. Although being
viewed by its proponents as a measure, which could enhance the legitimacy
of elections, there are a substantial number of critics who view this practice
with suspicion for a number of reasons.
This chapter will focus on these reasons and the responses they have drawn
from the proponents of international electoral assistance.
2. THE "INTERVENTIONORASSISTANCE"DEBATE
The monitoring of elections touches on a sensitive nerve in the debate about
the changing nature of national sovereignty - even more so than the question
of humanitarian asslstance" The latter can be justified by arguing that it
occurs under circumstances of political and economic breakdown where
governments are unable to provide for the needs of their citizens. In Chand's
opinion the same can be said about elections that take place as part of a
peace-building strategy. 52 When international monitoring is, however, being
conducted within functioning states, that in some cases have conducted a
second or even a third election, the complexity of this issue becomes more
obvious.
51 Korten, D.C. Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda
West Hartford: Kumarian Press p. 135
52 See Chand 1997, p. 549.
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A starting point for discussion would be to look at the conceptualisation of
"sovereignty" within the context of international law. According to Oppenheim,
it involves the popular characterisation of states as "the highest underived
power and as the exclusive competence to determine jurisdictional limits.,,53
When this understanding of the sovereignty concept is read together with
Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, which states that nothing contained in the
Charter shall authorise the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, a pretty strong case can be made
out against the principle of international election monltonnq."
The counter argument questions the extent of the boundaries of domestic
jurisdiction. Should the election process fall within the ambits of national
sovereignty, election observation can amount to intervention in a country's
domestic domain. Should it, however, fall within the sphere of international
law, it would not be the case.
Rwelamira and Ailola argue in favour of the latter.55They begin their argument
by pointing to the nightmare experiences of the Second World War, and the
subsequent adoption of the United Nations Charter. The atrocities that
occurred during the war period provided convincing evidence of the close
proximity between the brutal behaviour of a government towards its citizens,
and the core concerns of international law: the protection of human rights and
the maintenance of international peace and security.56The preamble to the
United Nations Charter reaffirmed this commitment to the protection of human
rights and in the equal rights of men and women. The further notion of a
"crime against humanity" that originated during the Nuremberg Military
tribunal, further affirmed the new contention of the existence of human rights
that are superior to the law of the state, and protected by international
53 Oppenheim, L. 1994: International Law: A Treatise in Darko Asante, K. ed. Election
Monitoring's Impact on the Law International Law and Politics Vol 26 No 235 p. 238
54 United Nations Charter: Article 2, Paragraph 7
55 AHola, D. and Rwelamira, M. 1994: International Monitoring of Free and Fair Elections in
Steytler, N. a.o eds. Free and Fair Elections, Cape Town: Juta p. 214.
56 See Steytler a.o. 1994, p. 214.
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sanctions, should they be violated. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights also contributed to the idea that popular sovereignty has become a
justification for the human right to participate in government. It thus reaffirmed
the notion that the will of the people remains the foundation on which
government authority has to be built.
The acceptance of these norms has, according to Ailola and Rwelamira,
brought with it the right of the international community to set standards which
states have to comply with should they wish to be accepted as fully fledged
members of the community of nations." The nature of current international
standards point to the conduct of democratic elections as the key symbol of a
state's commitment to the protection of human rights and international peace.
The three documents that bear evidence to this are the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the UN General Assembly Resolution
on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine
Elections and the Council of European Communities' Resolution on Human
Rights and Development. Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights ascribes to every person "the right to vote and to be elected at
genuine elections, which shall be universal with equal suffrage, and shall be
held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the
electors.,,58
The UN resolution asserts that: "as a matter of practical experience, the right
of everyone to take part in the government of his or her country is a crucial
factor in the effective enjoyment of all of a wide range of other human rights
and fundamental freedoms, embracing political, economic, social and cultural
rights.,,59The European Union also points to the link between the universal
nature of human rights and its supposed relationship to democracy. In its
resolution it states that: "The Council acknowledges that human rights have a
universal nature and it is the duty of all states to promote them. At the same
57 See Steytler a.o. 1994, p. 214.
58 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 25(b)
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time, human rights and democracy form part of a larger set of requirements in
order to achieve balanced and sustainable development."
In the opinion of Ailola and Rwelamira, the right to political participation, as
has been stated in the above documents, is for this reason, binding on all
signatories. In total such a view emphasises - with the sanction of
international law - the importance of free elections as the cornerstone of
human rights protection. On the basis of this they claim that international
election observation should be seen within the context of the above-
mentioned and other documents pertaining to the protection of basic human
rights. This view is subscribed to by Darko Asante who states that: "Since the
concept of sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention are clearly subject
to the requirements of international law, election monitoring therefore does
seek to endorse an international right and the UN in carrying out the process
does not violate the sovereignty of the monitored nation.,,5o
However noble the norms, intentions, and activities stated in the above
section, an increasing dissatisfaction with the practice of election observation
is coming to the fore - and surprisingly not from political incumbents, but from
pro-democratic civil society organisations in Africa. In the following section
these main points of discontent will be discussed along with recent responses
to them.
3. POINTS OF DISCONTENT
International election observation is not the panacea for unconsolidated
democracies. The Angolan elections and more recently the referendum in
East Timor, has crudely brought home this harsh reality. According to Thomas
Carothers, examples like these highlight the limitations of observing
elections." The truth is that observers cannot force irreconcilable parties to
59 United Nations: Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine
elections (GA Res. 45/150 1991)
6oDarkoAsante, K. 1994: Election Monitoring's Impact on the Law: Can it be reconciled with
sovereignty and non-intervention? International Law and Politics Vol. 26 No 235, p. 275
61Carothers,T. 1997: The Observers Observed Journal of Democracy Vol. 8 p. 21.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
30
cooperate. They cannot counter deeply ingrained political anti-democratic
instincts of political incumbents, and least of all can they guarantee that the
international community or individual nations will act decisively on findings of
electoral fraud.
However, he warns that there are number of current observation practices
that may lead to unsatisfactory electoral outcomes. Geisler points to the
Kenyan general elections of 1992 and the Ghanaian presidential elections of
the same year as examples of flawed elections that could have been
avoided.52 Obvious failures like these have led to a number of sceptics asking
whether the presence of international observers are not more damaging to the
achievement of long-term democratic stability than anything else. Some have
even gone so far as to suggest that voters have experienced severe betrayal
by international election observers. Carothers identifies elusive standards,
amateur observers, and partiality as the three central shortcomings that
should be addressed in future. In the following subsections each of these
points will be discussed in more detail.
3. 1 Elusive Standards
The notion of free and fair elections has become the popular measure
against which an electoral outcome is assessed. "Was it free and fair?" is
usually the first question asked by the international media at the conclusion of
an election. Less experienced observers are likely to provide them with the
sound bite they look for. Rarely does anyone enquire about the content of
such a pronouncement.
The debate of what should be regarded as free and fair is only now receiving
proper attention. Is there a universal conceptualisation of free and fair means,
and if not, it should be asked whether there is any sense in attempting to
achieve such a standard. As the debate develops, the paradox is gradually
62Geisler, G. 1993: Fair? What has Fairness Got to Do With It? Vagaries of Election
Observations and Democratic Standards The Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 31
NO.4 p. 613-614
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
31
becoming more obvious. Observers everywhere agree that elections have to
be free and fair, but one is likely to find as many interpretations of freeness
and fairness as there are observer groups.
At present a clear international measure seems to be lacking. Although
certain broad guidelines can be found in sources like the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights and the U.N.'s Human Rights and Elections Handbook, practical
circumstances have shown that observer missions are to a large extent
dependent on interpretations of the free and fair criteria within the context of a
specific election. These interpretations in effect become ad hoc standards that
cannot easily be compared with standards used elsewhere in other elections.
This apparent inconsistency in the use of yardsticks has been severely
criticised by domestic pro-democracy groupS.53While Western countries
demand that elections have to be conducted in a free and fair fashion, the
contradictions emanating from the standards being used cause confusion
about what is really required from the observed country.
Carothers notes that the spread of international election observation has
fostered a somewhat false perception that an ideal set of criteria exists for
electoral competition all over the world.54Experience has shown, he asserts,
that it is not the case. The popular definition of free and fair elections goes as
follows: Freeness refers to the ability of voters to participate in an election
without coercion or restrictions. Fairness again, relates to regularity (the
unbiased application of rules) and reasonableness (a fair distribution of
resources between competltors)." Should an election meet all or most
prerequisites, it can surely be declared free and fair. Should the opposite be
the case, it must clearly be declared not free and fair. What does however
happen when the conduct of an election falls somewhere in-between the
extremes. Carothers argues that many elections in politically transitional
63See Geisler 1993, p. 604
64SeeCarothers 1997, p. 24.
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countries fall somewhere in this grey area between the extremes. Very often
elections meet the freeness, but not the fairness criteria or vice versa. How
should the observer make sense of such a situation? It is within this space
that the controversy about the application of standards exists. In addition it
highlights the need for a more elaborate understanding of the free and fair
criteria that can be employed under most electoral circumstances.
One way of devising a framework within which elections can be evaluated is
to distinguish between a list of factors deemed necessary for an election to be
free and fair, to operationalise them, and then to judge each of these
individually. Elklit and Svensson argue that such an approach can be
troublesome. Firstly methodological problems might arise in determining
whether an individual category does indeed meet the established criteria.
Even more challenging might be an endeavour to combine the different
measures into a single score."
Instead they opt for a model that takes a more holistic approach to the judging
of elections. They state categorically that within the context of elections, the
phrase, "free and fair", should not be regarded as an internationally accepted
standard of electoral competition. According to these two authors no such
standard exists. The complex nature of an election campaign does not allow
for such a simplification.V They are nevertheless critically aware of the
dilemma that this causes for the election observation project as a whole.
Should they avoid the use of the phrase "free and fair", a real danger exists
that it might become the object of abuse of many who have little
understanding of the electoral process. Should they, however, choose to use
the phrase as convenient shorthand, they might open themselves to criticism
from their intellectual peers who will be quick to point out the discrepancies
contained in it. Their model is an attempt to side-step both these potential
65Elklit,J. and Svenson, P. 1997: What Makes Elections Free and Fair? Journal of
Democracy Vol. 8 No. 3 p. 35.
66SeeElklit and Svensson 1997, p. 34.
67SeeElklit and Svensson 1997, p. 43.
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pitfalls. Instead of indiscriminately using the "free and fair" criteria, they allow
for the more lenient categories of "acceptable" or "not acceptable".
Elklit and Svensson's point of departure is the clear distinction that they make
between the 'free" criteria and the "fair" criteria. They conclude that freedom
criteria should in most instances enjoy preference, because without political
freedom, the chances of election rules being applied fairly are minimal.
Fairness is also subdivided in its components parts, regularity and
reasonableness. Regularity, they assert, refers to the impartial application of
the electoral law and constitutional provisions, while reasonableness pertains
to equal opportunities for the exercise of political freedoms.
Apart from the clarification of these two concepts, another distinction is can be
made between events before, during, and after polling. A complete
observation mission should include each of these components and not only
observation on election day itself. The significance of observation in the pre-
election period lies in the assessment of whether the electoral law and
constitution allow voters the necessary freedom to participate meaningfully in
the voting process. Observation in the post-election period is vital in order to
establish whether electoral rules have been applied fairly and regularly. By
combining these two dimensions, the authors have constructed an electoral
checklist for both the free and the fair criteria, which they hope will provide a
number of general guidelines.58
Since electoral processes are not uniform, it is not feasible to assign specific
weights to each of the dimensions in this checklist. Elklit and Svensson,
however, identify a number of rules of thumb. Normally items in the "free"
category should take precedence over items in the fair column, because, as
has they have asserted, the chances of election rules being applied are fairly
minute without political freedom. Within the fair column items that pertain to
impartial application of electoral law should be regarded as more significant
68SeeElklit and Svensson 1997, p. 35.
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than those having to do with ideal opportunities for political competition."
Ideal conditions, especially in developing countries, are seldom present. Too
much emphasis on this aspect will disqualify many transitional elections.
For the abovementioned reason, the authors assert that a checklist, as has
been suggested above, cannot be used in isolation of the environment within
which the election takes place. In addition, they suggest that observers should
as far as possible try to evaluate the election within the context of the specific
political environment. Important here is to assess whether the electoral
process, despite its flaws and shortcomings, stands to have a consolidating
effect on democratisation process. Also to be considered is whether the
election result has been a true reflection of the will of the voter population.
These two considerations should not be taken to their extremes (The authors
caution that an election should not be judged favourably simply because it
contributes to political stability and order. Their focus should not be on
drawing political conclusions, but rather on delivering information on factual
occurrences within the electoral process)."
Elklit and Svensson suggest three distinctive contexts in terms of which
identified criteria should be judged. A graphic illustration is used to illuminate
their model (See Figure 3.1).71 Curve A represents transitional elections from
an authoritarian to a democratic state. In elections like these where very little
electoral infrastructure exists, it will be advisable to adopt a "looser"
interpretation of electoral standards. This should be allowed to ensure that too
high standards do not discourage former authoritarian countries from
embarking on the road to democratisation.
Curve B represents elections in the same position as those in Curve A, but
where there are reasonable indications that the incumbents might have
manipulated an election. The use of this category is an indication that "looser"
69SeeElklit and Svensson 1997, p. 38.
70SeeElklit and Svensson 1997, p. 38.
71SeeElklit and Svensson 1997, p. 42.
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standards for evaluation can and should not be applied arbitrarily to
encourage democratic consolidation. In the words of Geisler, " a flawed
election must be called a flawed election."
Figure 3.1.: Elklit and Svenson's Graph for Election Classification
y
/
x
A = Elec:lons from authoritarian to democratic state
B = Elecnons where Irregularities may have taken piace
C = Elections In Established Demoerasres
( Apart from orovidinq the context. axes x ano y have no srausucai slgnlflc::lnce I
Elections that are represented by Curve C signify e.ections that take place
within established and consolidated democracies. Since they have both a
democratic experience and a well-developed electoral infrastructure. stricter
standards should apply to electoral conduct. It should nevertheless be noted
that Curle C does not lie where the optimum points of freeness and fairness
meet. p,s has been asserted by_Jhe two authors, the complete fulfilment of
both conditons is unheard of.
The complexity of making a clear distinction between what is free and fair,
and what is not, is represented by the straight line that runs from the bottom
left to the top right corner of Figure 1. The crucial point is where the straight
line leaves the border of the shaded area at Curve C. It is here where the
distinction is made between acceptable and not acceptable. All elections that
can be categorised as falling within the grey area should be regarded as
acceptable. Elections falling in the area to the left of Curve A have been
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conducted in an unacceptable fashion, while those falling to the right of Curve
B should be regarded as having been conducted in an acceptable fashion.
The author regards this model as functional for the purpose of this work. It
succeeds in taking cognisance of both the immediate political environment
and universally accepted electoral standards. While acknowledging the virtual
impossibility of setting empirical standards to evaluate all elections, Elklit and
Svensson nevertheless provide a helpful parameter that goes far in providing
a set of guidelines that can be utilised within different contexts. These
guidelines will also be employed by the author to evaluate the
pronouncements of international election observers in South Africa's 1994
and 1999 general elections.
3.2 Amateurs at Work
Carothers remarks with regret that "like any high-growth industry, election
observation has become hindered by an excess of supply"." During the last
decade the number of organisations participating in international election
observation has mushroomed. A small number of these have made
substantial contributions to democratic consolidation around the world. Many
others have unfortunately displayed a high degree of unprofessional conduct.
Carothers notes that whenever a high-profile election is being conducted,
large numbers of small, poorly coordinated, observer missions swoop down
on the relevant country to make their presence felt. Many of these consist of
high-profile politicians with little or no experience of election observation. Their
motivation, they claim, is "the desire to express solidarity" with a newly
democratised country. He views these groups with a fair amount of
scepticism, and maintains that the only explanation for their presence is
political curiosity, or electoral tourism, as he calls it_13Instead of enhancing
the elections, they contribute little and sometimes even obstruct the smooth
running of electoral procedures. In many instances it has happened that
72SeeCarothers 1997, p. 22.
73SeeCarothers 1997, p. 22.
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during the most crucial administrative preparations these groups will overrun
electoral commissions with requests for briefings. More than often seeking the
spotlight, they are also the first with hasty post-election statements that in
some instances detract from statements made by experienced observer
groups at a later staqe."
A trademark of inexperienced observer missions is that they tend to spend a
disproportionate amount of time on the election itself, forgetting that it is just
one constituent part of a more expansive electoral process." Three or four
days before the election day they jet in, only to hold a short news conference
at the closing of the polls and leave straight afterwards - in some instances
even before the votes have been counted. As has been mentioned in
subsection 3.1, many things can happen both before and after election day
that can jeopardise an acceptable electoral outcome. Institutional defects,
restrictive electoral laws and intimidation are all factors that can have a
substantial influence on the outcome of an election, even if polling took place
without incident. An unbalanced focus on election day may well lead to a
favourable evaluation of an otherwise unconvincing electoral process.
Entrenched leaders have picked up this weakness, and the manipulation of
election procedures preceding the actual voting is becoming ever more
sophisticated.
Apart from the irregularities that might go undetected if observers merely
focus on election day, there is another important argument in favour of more
comprehensive observer missions that give equal attention to all phases of
the electoral process. It is important for individual observers to get used to the
country, its people, and more importantly its political climate. In this period a
relationship of trust has to be fostered between observers, local NGOs, and
political parties contesting the election.
74SeeCarothers 1997, p. 22 and Geisler 1993, pp. 618-619.
75SeeCarothers 1997, p. 22
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The unflattering image of international election observation as a largely
uncoordinated practice, based on uninformed assumptions and run by people
that leave as suddenly as they arrive, is not doing the observation practice
any good. It should in all fairness be noted that short-term observation is often
enforced by lack of funds to stay for the duration of the whole electoral
process. Nevertheless, if they wish to retain (some would argue, regain) its
credibility among democratising states, practitioners of electoral observation
are well advised to search for ways that will foster greater cooperation
amongst themselves. Not only will it enhance greater uniformity in the use of
standards, if organised effectively, but it can also be cost saving. Things have,
however, been changing over the past four years.
At the IDEAs 1995 conference on international election observation a number
of general recommendations, aimed at the enhancement of professional
observation missions, were made. The following are some of the main
conclusions of the conference. :76
a. The need has been expressed for a central mechanism through
which information can be exchanged and shared.
b. Although differences in approach and methodology will always
exist, greater cooperation should be achieved through the
establishment of some kind of coordination team on which all
credible organisations can be represented.
c. Each observer group or institution may issue its own statements,
conclusions, judgements and press reports at its own discretion.
However the collective sharing of information and observations is
essential and will enhance the quality, accuracy and credibility of
individually issued statements.
761DEA and U.N., 1995: International Election Observation: Seventeen organizations
share experiences on electoral observation Stockholm: IDEA p. 20.
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d. A joint cooperative approach to election monitoring and observation
is not only desirable but also necessary, particularly in large
countries.
e. A multilateral approach is generally favoured as a more effective
and credible basis for international election observation.
Since these recommendations were made in 1995, their central thrust (i.e.
inter-organisational cooperation) has become part of international electoral
observation practice. The U.N. has taken a leading role in the creation of
JIOG's that facilitate better cooperation and sharing of information between
participant observer groups. These missions usually arrive a month or two
before an election is due to take place. They familiarise themselves with the
political climate, and when short-term observers arrive, the knowledge
gathered by the JIOG can be passed over to them.
As has been mentioned in Chapter 2 this practice is being used more
regularly for the simple reason that it is more cost effective. Another less
obvious advantage of JIOGs is that a commonly agreed upon purpose and
terms of reference are established before observation starts. Throughout the
election all observer missions share information. At its conclusion, electoral
observers are therefore in a better position to do a better-informed evaluation
of the election.
3.3 Partiality of Observers
The presence of international election observers has become a sine qua non
for the quest for political impartiality at transitional elections. As has been
mentioned in the first chapter, the international legitimacy that it affords to
elections is arguably the most obvious argument advanced in favour of an
international presence during an electoral process."
77 Mair, S. 1997: Election Observation: Roles and Responsibilities of Long-term Election
Observers ECDPM: http://www.oneworld.org/ecdpm/pubs/wp22_gb.htm15/7/1999
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This unsullied image has, however, been scathed during recent years.
According to Carothers many observers do not hesitate to pursue partisan
political agendas to the overall detriment of the practice of international
election observation around the world.
In her critical 1993 article about the state of election observation in Africa,
Geisler suggests that Western standards with regard to electoral conduct and
democratisation generally seem to be at odds with what is happening in
practice." In support of her statement, she asserts that pronouncements by
both the Commonwealth Observer Team and the American ambassador
about the standards being used in Kenya's 1992 election point to a number of
contradictions. Initially international standards were set, but as soon as it
became clear that under these standards the elections were doomed to
failure, they reverted to standards that she considers questionable. In
addition, she also points to dubious election standards that have been applied
by France in its former colonies, the clearest example being Cameroon in the
October 1992 elections. She concludes that the mantra of good governance,
so ardently propagated by the West to African countries, may have more to do
with accepting the right economic policies than with adhering to recognised
economic prlnciples."
Also hinting at this possibility is The Economist, which suggests that the highly
controversial re-election of Gerry Rawlings in Ghana's 1991 presidential
elections might have been influenced by similar considerations. It remarks
that good democratic practices could well have ruined the country's admirable
performance in economic restructuring achieved under Rawlings.8o In
essence these contentions by academics and the press suggest that pro-
78SeeGeisler 1993, pp. 630-631
79SeeGeisler 1993, p. 631
8<TheEconomist 1992: In Geisler (ed.) in The Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 31 NO.4
p.618.
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democracy campaigners in host countries are increasingly viewing election
observation as 'free market policing,' rather than democratic assistance.
This phenomenon is not peculiar to Africa. Haiti's local and legislative
elections of 1995 also provided ample backing for claims that institutional
partiality is alive and well in the practice of international election observation.
The official U.S. observer delegation, representing a government that had to
prove that its democracy promotion initiatives had been successful, found that
the elections had been conducted in favourable conditions. It was not
surprising then that the International Republican Institute (NRI), that was
highly critical of the mentioned policy, pointed to a substantial number of
irregularities that tarnished the outcome. Similarly Carothers points to
observer missions of European political parties - such as the Socialist
International and the Liberal International - that tend to cast their judgements
along the lines of ideological affiliation. This, he contends, has especially been
the case in Eastern Europe and Latin America."
Examples like the above have cost the international election observation
project some of its former prestige. Pro-democratic forces in transitional
countries regard these actions as a betrayal of ordinary voters and have been
fierce in their criticism of it. Gradually a growing number of organisations are
opting for greater cooperation between international observers and their local
counterparts. This trend has gained impetus, especially since the 1995 IDEA
Conference where strong emphasis had been laid on the need for closer
cooperation between observer groups.82 Although not all international
missions are guilty of partiality, they feel that increased cooperation will go a
long way in dispelling the distrust that may lead to conflicting pronouncements
and eventual resentment between groups that are campaigning for the same
cause.
81SeeCarothers 1997, p. 26.
821DEA and U.N. 1995, p. 20.
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Local groups around the world have for some time now been involved in
domestically driven election observation activities. These missions have
generally been organised by civic organisations or networks of NGOs that
provide the organisational infrastructure and logistical support; do the
recruiting and training of observers and gather, communicate and analyse all
forms of data. Maybe the most significant aspect of domestic observation
efforts is that they make their own conclusions about the conduct of the
elections and present their findings to the electoral authorities.f Even though
domestic observation has become a common phenomenon, very little
attention has up to now been given to its accomplishments. There are a
number of reasons for this.
Firstly domestic observers can't compete with their international counterparts
when it comes to the availability of funding, training and logistics. International
observers have a clear advantage in matters relating to the technical and
organisational aspects of election observation. They can draw on a vast
source of expertise encompassing all aspects pertaining to electoral
assistance. Sufficient funding also allows them to import everything that might
be lacking in local infrastructure."
Arguably one of the more significant contentions in the discourse about the
relative value of domestic observers is the notion that international observers
will have much more legitimacy than locals. It is especially here where
domestic observers in transitional societies will have an up-hill battle in
convincing fellow citizens of their credentials. It is to expected that levels of
mutual trust between citizens will be low after prolonged periods of internal
political division. It is most likely that domestic observers will under these
circumstances find it hard to convince the populace of their impartiality. An
international presence on the other hand, the common perception goes, is
more likely to draw confidence and trust from a wider cross-section in post-
"Nevltte, N. and Canton, S. 1997: The Rise of Election Monitoring: The Role of Domestic
Observers Journal of Democracy Vol. 8 No.3, p. 48.
84 See Nevitte and Canton 1997, p. 49.
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conflict societies. As has been indicated earlier, these contentions do not
standing on the same firm ground as they did in previous times. Still there
might be those who will argue that the conflict potential is much lower when
international observers make a pronouncement on the acceptability of an
election than would be the case with their local colleagues.
These arguments, convincing as they might be, must, however, be viewed
within a wider context. It is inconceivable that foreign observers will be
present to observe each and every election following a transitional election.
Even if they should choose to observe a second and third election, practical
experience has shown that the number of observers will decrease with each
election. Should they solely concentrate on the actual observation and
technical assistance where the host nation falls short, the contribution of
international observers can at most be regarded as infrastructural. A good
infrastructure does however not guarantee the long-term aspiration of
democratic consolidation. Neither does one election that was conducted in an
acceptable fashion. As in the case with most established democracies, the
road to democratic consolidation has not been a brief one. In some instances
it took place over centuries that included bloody wars.
When an assessment is made of the contribution that international election
observers can make to this process in a newly established democracy, it can
be argued that whatever it is, it must be something lasting that outlives their
relatively short stay. The author concurs with Guillermo O'Donnell when he
remarks that the essence of conducting an election does not only lie in
conducting it in an acceptable fashion, but also that there is a "generalised
expectation that a fair electoral process and its surrounding freedoms will
continue into an indefinite future."a5
Nevitte and Canton share this concern that a series of free and fair elections
alone may not break the grip that authoritarianism can have on a society."
SSO'Donnell, G. 1996: Illusions About Consolidation Journal of Democracy Vol. 7 p. 36.
S6Nevitte and Canton 1997, p. 50.
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They believe that the nurturing of other elements essential to a vibrant
democracy is just as important as the actual conduct of an election. This must
always be kept in mind whenever discussing the virtues and drawbacks of
domestic election monitoring. For this reason they argue that close co-
operation between domestic and international observers is not only advisable,
but a dire necessity. Both stand to benefit.
For international observers the knowledge of the location, language and
culture that their local counterparts have, is essential to conduct a successful
observation mission. Due to their superior numbers, domestic observers can
also cover more polling stations in their observation effort. They can in turn
benefit from the international experience that foreign observers have, and
importantly, they can become au fait with the latest technology being used to
make elections quicker and more fool proof. It is however a number of
recurring themes in the practice of domestic observation identified by Nevitte
and Canton which suggest that closer cooperation between international and
domestic observers might have a enhancing effect on democratic
consolidation.
One such a pattern is that domestic observer groups seldom disband after the
conclusion of an election. They generally emerge from the first round of
elections with more visibility and credibility than when they entered. In many
instances this newly found credibility serves as encouragement to become
more involved in the political life of a country." It has become almost
customary that the organisation of a domestic observation mission is only the
first phase in a group's organisational life. From here, they start to participate
in other efforts promoting the cause of institutional democracy. These efforts
may take on the form of a variety of activities, but there are a number of traits
that they have in common.
Firstly, nation-wide election observation is almost always followed by other
observation efforts, be they municipal, general or presidential elections. The
87Nevitte and Canton 1997, p. 56.
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more they become involved, the faster their credibility will rise among all
segments of society.
Secondly, most groups tend to become involved to some degree in citizen
education proqrarnrnes." Some programmes are low key and consist mostly
of the distribution of literature regarding voter rights and election law. Other
programmes are more challenging in nature. Those falling in the latter group
often use sophisticated tools such as the electronic media to transmit their
message.
A third activity often undertaken by domestic observer groups is the lobbying
for electoral reform.89 This is usually a natural consequence of their practical
experience in election observation. Lobbying may be done in informal ways,
amounting to quiet consultation with election commissions, or alternatively it
might be directly focussed on the media and/or political parties.
Domestic observation activities are not limited to the main categories
mentioned in the above paragraphs. Apart from observing, citizen education,
and lobbying they also make contributions with regard to civic education in
school programmes, training of local government officials, while others
strongly campaign for greater involvement of women in qovernrnent"
A second distinctive pattern that is taking shape is the increasing cooperation
among different civic groups within a particular region. This trend is
manifested in a growing number of civic coalitions that are being formed for
the purpose of election observation and civic education programmes.
Whereas it has been mentioned that electoral NGO's are becoming more
specialised, it is only fairly recently that they have shed some of the
institutional pride that characterise this sector. The cross-fertilisation of
88 Nevitle and Canton 1997, p. 57.
89 Nevitle and Canton 1997, p. 57.
90 Nevitle and Canton 1997, p. 57.
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different approaches, which is the product of such co-operation, can only be
to the benefit of the long-term process of skill development.
Given the above considerations, the author contends that the empowerment
of domestic observer groups is a long-term objective that international
observers should invest in. The contribution that they can make to kick-start
democratic development is significant and cannot be overlooked. They are not
in a position to keep a democracy alive superficially. In the long-term it will be
the responsibility of the civil society to facilitate the acceptance of democratic
practices among the general population. Helping it on its feet through the
initial stages of democratic transformation will be the best possible legacy that
international observers can leave behind. Whether an international observer
mission has contributed to this end should undoubtedly be one of the
yardsticks against which their performance should be measured.
4. CRITERIA FOR THE EFFICIENT CbNDUCT OF ELECTION
OBSERVATION
Under the preceding headings I have highlighted some of the major criticisms
against the practice of international election observation. The major objections
relate in essence around three issues: a lack of universal electoral standards,
unprofessional observers and partiality by observers. By looking at the
responses of international think tanks and scholars to some of these charges,
I have distilled three prerequisites for the efficient conduct of international
observation missions. These conditions, that will now be reviewed in brief, will
be employed to evaluate the conduct of international observers in the two
South African general elections that they have borne testimony to.
A. Flexible Electoral Standards
I concur with Elklit and Stevenson when they assert that there is no single
universal standard that can be followed point by point to attest to the freeness
and fairness of an election. The amount of country-specific variables that may
impact on an election are simply too many to fathom with a single, clear-cut
measure. Indiscriminate enforcement of such a measure will be to the
detriment of democratisation attempts worldwide.
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This does not imply that that there are no broad standards that should be set
to evaluate elections. Any election still has to be founded on basic democratic
principles that are common to all democracies. The measure of "acceptability"
that Elklit and Stevenson employ provides for a yardstick that scrutinises all
stages of the electoral process, but acknowledges the context within which it
takes place. Since the level of 'democratic maturity' in the established
Western democracies are far more advanced than that of recently
democratised countries, it will be unfair to employ the rigid standards of the
former to states that are still in the process of building up a democratic
infrastructure. A negative finding on the part of the international community
may only discourage those states that have embarked on their first hesitant
steps to democratic reform.
When assessing the South African experience with international observers, an
evaluation of the standards that they have applied should thus take
cognisance of the context within which the 1994 and 1999 elections took
place. Since circumstances to both these elections were unique, their impact
on the actual electoral process cannot be ignored.
B. Professional Practices
The reputation of international election observation has on a number of
occasions been tarnished by unprofessional conduct by its practitioners. The
sight of observers arriving a couple days before the election and leaving
shortly afterwards, cannot but leave the observer of observers sceptical of
what they could realistically have achieved in such a short space of time.
Such behaviour not only compromises the moral authority they have as
neutral third parties, but can be to the detriment of the electoral campaign in
its entirety.
Most of the problems with regard to this matter stem from a lack of a
coordinated observation effort by international observation missions. It should
be noted that although there are a number of organisations that appear to be
conducting their observation efforts more for the sake of organisational
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prestige than in the interest of the host country, there are many efforts that fail
simply due to a lack of proper funding.
As has been mentioned earlier, an observation mission is incomplete without
attention being paid to all possible factors that might impact significantly on
the results, both before and after election day. A shortage of funds, however,
makes it difficult to cover a period that might span over several months. Some
of the organisations that have a permanent presence within the relevant
countries are less affected, but to those that will be present only for the
duration of the campaign, the expenses to be incurred are a significant
consideration. Many are thus forced to make their stay as brief as possible,
and consequently they never get a proper feel for the political climate of the
host country.
To overcome the abovementioned problem, it is suggested that a co-
ordinating body be established, which allows observer groups to draw from
each other's information and experience. Short-term observers thus stand to
benefit from their colleagues that represent long-term missions or
organisations that have a permanent presence within the host nation. It is to
be expected that institutional pride might be an inhibiting factor to such
cooperation, but the savings in costs will become increasingly important if the
declining trend in funding for observation missions continues.
The UN, by means of its JIOG's, has up to now been the only organisation
with the organisational and financial capabilities to establish these co-
ordinating bodies. It also established a JIOG to co-ordinate foreign observer
efforts in South Africa's 1999 general elections. Whether it achieved its
objectives will be established in the following chapter.
C. Observer Impartiality
The primary motivation forwarded for the presence of international observers
in transitional elections has always been that it provides for neutral oversight
of the electoral process. As has been indicated, the actual practice has shown
that this has not always been the case. Charges of economic and ideological
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tutelage have become a regular feature of elections that have been conducted
in politically volatile areas.
To counter the resentment and distrust that have arisen as a consequence of
the perceived partiality of some observer groups, it is suggested that a close
working relationship be established between international observer missions,
the relevant electoral commission, and especially local observer groups. The
fruits of such co-operation may eventually stretch beyond the fostering of
mutual trust.
Since international observation will not be a permanent feature of elections, it
is conceivable that at some stage the conduct of observation will become the
sole responsibility of local observers. For this reason, it is vital that less
experienced local observer missions be assisted in both the methodology and
technology involved in the conduct of observer missions. Most importantly
though, cooperation and association with international observer groups
provide an ideal opportunity for them to establish trust and legitimacy among
the populace. Should they succeed, experience has shown that many of these
groups have moved on to become permanent fixtures that make active
contributions to democratic initiatives in civil society. Such initiatives will in
the long term contribute to democratic consolidation and should be
encouraged accordingly.
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CHAPTER4
International Election Observation In South Africa's 1994
and 1999 Elections An Assessment of their
Contributions
1. INTRODUCTION
In the preceding chapters I assessed the current state of international election
observation and the debates surrounding it. Aspects such as the rationale for
international observation, the manifestation thereof, and the major criticisms
levelled against it were addressed. These discussions have culminated in the
identification of three key requirements for the conduct of effective
international observation efforts. These are: 1) sound, but flexible, electoral
standards; 2) professional conduct by observers and observer missions and
3) observer impartiality. It has to be emphasised that although the author does
not claim that these are the only conditions, they are central to any
observation effort of this nature.
The aim of this endeavour so far has been to create the required context for
the evaluation of observation efforts in South Africa's two democratic general
elections in 1994 and 1999. In both instances a number of intergovernmental
and non-governmental organisations were invited to witness the conduct of
the electoral process.
Although the underlying rationale for international observation (i.e. compliance
to international human rights standards, as discussed in Chapter 3) remained
the same in 1999, the changes in the South African political landscape were
marked. In addition, the legislative environment governing electoral conduct
also underwent a number of far-reaching adjustments. These pieces of
legislation had important implications no only for voters, but also for the future
conduct and mandate of election observers in general. For the sake of
comprehensiveness it is essential to take cognisance of these factors.
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This chapter will be subdivided into two sections: Section A assessing the
1994 effort, and Section B looking at events pertaining to the 1999 elections.
Both sections will be similar in structure. Firstly a background sketch will be
provided, which describes the political climate, the legislative environment and
the participants in observation efforts. Within the context provided, I will
proceed with an assessment of the actual observation effort by means of the
identified criteria. On completion of both evaluations, a short summary of the
major findings will be provided.
2. SECTION A: THE 1994 INTERNATIONAL ELECTION
OBSERVATION EFFORT
2.1 The Political Climate
The 1994 general election was the culmination of a process that started in
1990 with the unbanning of the major liberation movements by former
President F.W. de Klerk. At the time De Klerk also signalled his commitment
to a negotiation process aimed at the attainment of a political dispensation
that would enjoy the support of all South Africans. The resulting multi-party
Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), dominated by the ruling
National Party (NP) and the African National Congress (ANC) commenced in
December 1991.
Four years later on 27 April 1994, the country's first democratic election
brought it to the threshold of a new era that signified a decisive break with its
turbulent history. The relative calm in which the elections were conducted,
however, belied the fierce confrontations at the preceding CODESA talks,
where the peace process had been on the verge of breakdown on a number
of occasions. The violent contest for political support, especially in KwaZulu-
Natal, also pointed to a potentially disastrous election campaign. If one
reflects on the number of occasions the process hung in the balance, the now
all too common description of the election as a "miracle" still holds true.
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After the initial success at CODESA, a second round of talks, CODESA 2 was
scheduled for May 1992.91 This second round, though, came to a standstill
when negotiators failed to agree on the composition of a future constitution-
making body.92 Further talks failed to resume in the wake of increased violent
conflict between the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and ANC in the Zulu
heartland of KwaZulu-Natal. Exacerbating the political deadlock, were
incidents like the Boipatong massacre which sparked off a campaign of 'rolling
mass action', initiated by the ANC and its alliance partners, the South African
Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions
(COSATU).93
A renewed bid to salvage the negotiation process was launched in April 1993
when 26 political parties gathered at the World Trade Centre in
Johannesburg. In the course of this third round of talks, which became known
as the Multi-Party Negotiation Process (MNP), the IFP and the Conservative
Party (CP) made their exit from the process due to their opposition to the
agreed-upon transitional process. Probably the biggest breakthrough at these
talks was the agreement reached on the election date of 27 April 1994.
September of that same year also saw the enactment of four key pieces of
legislation by parliament that provided for the creation of institutions, which
together with the interim constitution would be responsible for governing the
electoral process." These were the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), the
interim executive body created to supervise government actions in the run-up
to the elections; the Independent Media Commission (IMC), monitoring all
sources broadcasting electoral content, as well as state-financed publications
and communications services; the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA),
91 Napier, C.: The Origins and Implementation of the South African Constitution
http://www.unisa.ac.za/deptlpress/politeia/152/origins/html 15/01/2000
92 Commonwealth Secretariat, 1994: The End of Apartheid: The Report of the
Commonwealth Observer Group to the South Africa Elections 26-29 April 1994, London
p.7.
93 Anglin 1995, p. 522.
94 Suggot, M and Hess, S. 1997: Tampering With Pre-1994 History Daily Mail and Guardian
http://www.web.sn.apc.org/wmail/issues/970227/NEWS110.htmI14/01/2000
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regulating the electronic media, and the Independent Electoral Commission
(IEC) responsible for the conduct and administration of the election." The last
mentioned had specific bearing on the mandate and participation of foreign
election observers within the South African context. The act made specific
provision for the witnessing of both the voting and counting stages by
independent observer groups.96
Even though the green light for international election observation was given
only in 1993, a significant number of IGOs and international NGOs were
already established in the country well before year-end 1992. Initially the NP
Government brushed aside suggestions by the ANC and prominent
community leaders, like Archbishop Desmond Tutu, for an international
observer presence. The 1992 deadlock at CODESA 2, and the Boipatong
massacre, which highlighted the inability of local parties to contain political
violence brought a turning point in the government's approach to foreign
election observation." Another factor that provided momentum to the process
was the visit of a U.N. fact-finding team which succeeded to allay some of
Pretoria's fears on the issue.
This team was mandated by UN resolution 772 to investigate the demands
that would be made by an observer presence of the U.N. The particular
resolution that was adopted by the Security Council on 17 August 1992,
underlined the Council's agreement on the necessity of the deployment of an
international observer contingent in South Africa.98The resolution also called
on other international organisations to send their observer groups to South
Africa. The success of the fact-finding mission paved the way for the first
contingent of 50 observers of the U.N. Observer Mission to South Africa
(UNOMSA) to arrive in the last quarter of 1992.
95 See Commonwealth Secretariat 1999, p. 7.
96 Electoral Act (No. 202) of 1993
97 See Anglin 1995, p. 520.
98 See Geldenhuys 1998, p. 84.
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Other missions soon followed. The European Community Observer Mission in
South Africa (ECOMSA) deployed 15 observers by the end of 1992, and
became only the second EC observer mission to be deployed since
Yugoslavia. A Commonwealth Delegation of 12 observers also arrived in
October 1992, and was followed by an 11-member contingent of the
Organisation for African Unity (OAU) in November of that same year. By the
end of 1992 all of these organisations operated under the mandate of Security
Council resolution 772, which required them to monitor political violence and
the negotiation process. In practice this amounted to the monitoring of public
political activities and the reaction of the security forces to it; ensuring the
compliance of all signatories to the code of conduct for political parties and
organisations; and scrutinising the implementation of recommendations by the
Goldstone Commission on matters pertaining to the peaceful conduct of the
electoral process." In addition to the intergovernmental organisations, a
substantial amount of international NGOs also started arriving in the country.
At this stage the mandate of the four IGOs was limited to the peace-
monitoring function that they have been performing since their arrival in 1992.
It did not include matters pertaining to the electoral process itself. This was
still the domain of the IEC, whose Election Monitoring Directorate (EMD) had
been given the task of monitoring matters that might impinge on the electoral
process, but significantly also on the IEC's internal performance. In practice
the EMD's task translated into monitoring each step of the electoral process,
investigating complaints, and resolving these by mediation or reference to an
adjudication tribunal.l'" Most significantly though was the fact that at the
conclusion of the electoral process, the IEC was the only body that could
legally make a ruling on the freeness and fairness of the electoral process.
There is no international precedent for this practlce.'?'
99 See Geldenhuys 1998, p. 85.
100 The Independent Electoral Commission, 1994: Report of the Independent Electoral
Commission: The South African Elections of April 1994 Johannesburg p.43.
101 Stober, P. 1994: The pressure's on to declare the poll fair Weekly Mail & Guardian
29 April - 6 May p. 5.
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What observer groups were, however, lobbying for was an expanded
mandate, which inter alia would have provided for supervising the electoral
process. Since observation as a means of electoral assistance was provided
for in the Electoral Act of September 1993, international missions were
dependent on an invitation from the South African authorities. This invitation
came on 9 December 1993 when the four IGOs were requested to make
available an adequate number of international observers that could provide
verification of all stages of the electoral process.'?" As indicated in Chapter 2,
verification implies that the electoral process is organised and administered by
the national election authority, while the relevant organisation(s) is asked to
verify the acceptability of all aspects of the process. However, the latter did
not have any legally binding powers. On 14 January 1994 UN Security
Council Resolution 894 was passed, which provided a mandate for the
coordination of observers from the four IGO's and foreign governments.103
The new expanded mandate added a significant number of responsibilities to
the peace-monitoring function already performed by the IGO observer groups.
These included the monitoring of the IEC, the Independent Media
Commission and the security forces; the verification of voter education
programmes, the issuing of ID documents; the secrecy and security of the
ballots; and finally to scrutinize the freedom to participate in any form of legal
political activity.l'" To cope with the additional duties some of the major IGO
observer bodies underwent a number of structural changes. The U.N. opted to
divide its operations into two branches. The work performed by UNOMSA
under the U.N.'s original mandate was to be continued by the newly formed
Peace Promotion Division, while an Electoral Division, similar to that which
had been used four years earlier in Namibia, was created to deal with its
electoral responsibilities. The Commonwealth similarly designated the
Commonwealth Observer Group (COGSA), to observe all possible factors
and activities that might have bearing on the eventual outcome of the electoral
102 See Anglin 1995, p. 527.
103 See Commonwealth Secretariat 1994, p. 4.
104 See Anglin 1995, p. 527.
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process.l'" In line with previous missions, the Commonwealth observer
contingent consisted of a so-called "eminent persons group" that was
representative of its member states. In addition the European Union also
established an electoral body, the European Union Election Unit (EUNELSA)
that operated separately from ECOMSA.
Each of the four intergovernmental organisations maintained its own identity
during the electoral process, but nevertheless cooperated very closely in the
execution of the observation effort. Four months prior to the election date, the
TEC requested the U.N. and IEC to jointly coordinate the deployment of
international observers from the various intergovernmental and
nongovernmental organisations. To accede to this request, three additional
bodies were formed under the auspices of UNOMSA's Electoral Division.106
These were a Coordinating Committee, consisting of the heads of mission of
the four IGO's; a Technical Task Force, made up of electoral experts from
these missions; and a Joint Operations Unit.
Over a period of two years the international presence of observers grew
steadily, and the addition of election observation to those tasks already
performed resulted in a new burst of observers arriving in the country. At the
height of their activities UNOMSA had a staff of 2 120, the EU 326, the OAU
150 and the Commonwealth (see Table 4.1).107 Apart from the IGOs there
were 97 international NGOs that ranged in nature from specialist electoral
organisations, like the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES),
to the International Council of Free Trade Unions and the World Council of
Churches.When all the groups were taken together they amounted to a grand
total of 6 000 international observers. Add to this the almost 20 000 monitors
hired by the IEC, and it becomes clear why this election has been termed the
most monitored in history. In the week preceding election day, a heading in
105 See Commonwealth Secretariat 1994, p. 7.
106 See Geldenhuys 1998, p. 91.
107 See Anglin 1995, p. 519.
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the Weekly Mail & Guardian newspaper aptly remarked in response to this
large observer turnout that "All the world is an observer in SA's poll,,.108
Also worth mentioning is international involvement in other aspects of the
1994 election. The IEC that was monitored throughout the electoral process
by international and national observer bodies, had 5 of its 16 members
coming from abroad (Canada, Eritrea, United States, Zimbabwe and
Denmark)."?" Even though they had no voting powers, their presence in the
body that was responsible for organising, conducting and monitoring the
election process not only ensured a significant amount of transparency, but
also made available expertise to a relatively inexperienced commission.
Table 4.1: Total Number of Intergovernmental Observers in South Africa
(1994)
Organisation Peace Observers Election Observers
Nr. Nr.
United Nations UNOMSA 50 UNOMSA 1985
European Union EGOMSA 20 EUNELSA 322
Commonwealth GOMSA 17 GOGSA 104
Organisation of OAU Observer Mission 13 OUA Observer Mission 108
African Unity
100 2513
108 Stober, P. and Powers, G. 1994: All the world's an observer in SA's poll Weekly Mail and
Guardian April 22 - 28, p. 8.
109 See Geldenhuys 1998, p. 92.
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Technical and financial support was also forthcoming from the international
cornmunlty.!" Both the U.N. and the EU seconded technical experts in the
fields of security, mediation, police investigations, logistics, information
analysis and voter education. The Commonwealth made its contribution in the
technical field by providing training to electoral officials and monitors. In
addition it also drew on British policing skills to establish a communication
network for the employment of the large amount of international observers.
Election day dawned on 27 April 1994, and over the following four days during
which voting took place (due to infrastructural problems voting had to be
extended) South Africa experienced its most peaceful period in months. In a
last ditch effort the IFP was also persuaded to participate in the election,
thereby ensuring the prevention of further bloodshed in the troubled province
of Natal (currently KwaZulu-Natal). It was estimated that the four major IGOs
succeeded in reaching 90% of the 8 478 polling stations. Despite major
administrative problems, ranging from the non-delivery of ballot papers to
irregularities during the counting process, the IEC saw it fit to declare the
election process "substantially free and fair" .111 All of the major international
observer groups concurred with this finding and congratulated both the people
of South Africa and the IEC with this acccmptlshment.l'"
In the following section I will look at the modus operandi of the major observer
groups that participated in South Africa's 1994 elections. This review will be
done by assessing some of the criteria earlier identified in this paper.
2.2 Evaluation
2.2.1 Electoral Standards
It has been asserted in the preceding section that an acceptable standard for
free and fair elections does not exist. To judge whether these traits (free and
fair) have been part of an electoral process, it has been suggested that an
110 See Geldenhuys 1998, p. 93.
111 See The Independent Electoral Commission 1994, p. 1.
112 See Anglin 1995, p. 541.
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encompassing method of reaching a conclusion would be to take into
consideration country-specific factors and reading them within the context of
the basic democratic requirements for the conduct of an election. Such a
system would ensure that a newly democratised country does not become
discouraged by external standards used in settled democracies.
What standards have been used in the 1994 elections and how effective have
they been in their application? When looking at the reports and comments of
observer missions to the country, it appears as if they did acknowledge the
unique political predisposition in which South Africa found itself in the run-up
to the April election. The joint final statement by the heads of mission of the
Commonwealth, OAU as well as the final report of the Secretary General of
the UN, revealed sensitivity for the conditions under which the elections have
been conducted.!" Both statements referred to irregularities and
administrative shortcomings that were exposed during the process, but after
weighing up the positive and negative factors, both came to the conclusion
that "the outcome of the elections reflected the will of the people of South
Africa"."!" Significantly though, both refrained from using the expression, "free
and fair".
The Commonwealth in its separate statement acknowledged the unique
context within which the process had taken place. Aspects mentioned were
short deadlines, lack of population data, and complex legal structures. It
echoed the view voiced in the joint statement that the process reflected the
will of the South African people, but ventured a step further in declaring that it
was "substantially free". 115 Although the semantics differed, all the major
international missions therefore stood by the IEC's evaluation that the
electoral process and its own conduct, amounted to an election legitimate in
its outcome.
113 United Nations, 1994: Final Report of the Secretary General on the question of South
Africa http://www.anc.org.za/U.N.lundocs4b.htmI20/1 0/1999
114 See United Nations 1994, http://www.anc.org.za/U.N.lundocs4b.htmI12/8/1999
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Not as complimentary, was an editorial published in the Weekly Mail &
Guardian of 29 April to 6 May 1994, which launched a stinging attack on the
IEC's handling of the process. According to the weekly, "there is no point in
mincing words about that organisation. Despite hundreds of millions of rands,
lavish salaries and massive popular support, they have messed it up through
sheer tncompetence.'?" The castigation continued in the following week's
editorial: "What happened? An incompetent IEC bungled the administration of
the election wholly and completely - it couldn't even get ballots to the voters,
its security systems were inadequate, its counting plans non-existent. This
opened the way to fraud on a massive scale - but so hopeless was the IEC
organisation that it had been unable to pinpoint the fraud and deal with it in
any normal way."117
Even though not put as bluntly, the major international missions also
substantiated in observer reports some of these accusations.l" In its final
report on the South African elections the Commonwealth also highlighted
aspects like the IEC's inability to provide about 20% of polling stations with
electoral materials in time, irregularities that took place during the voting
process, and the slow and sloppy counting of the votes.J" Similar concerns
were raised in the report of the U.N.'s Secretary General. Geldenhuys also
notes that a secret EU report pointed to evidence of 'serious administrative
problems', serious irregularities' and 'chaos which invited to cheat'."? Despite
these reservations, all observer bodies eventually gave the process their
stamp of approval. It must be assumed that in order for them to do so, there
had to be very convincing reasons which cancelled out the detracting factors
mentioned above. If not, arguments like those of Geissler could well be
115 See Commonwealth Secretariat 1994, p. 71.
116 Mail & Guardian, 1994: Free-ish and fair-ish, despite the lEG 29 April- 5 May, p. 20.
117 Mail & Guardian, 1994: Judge and be Judged 6 - 12 May, p. 16.
118 See Commonwealth Secretariat 1994, pp. 67 -71. and United Nations 1994,
http://www.anc.org.za/U .N./undocs4b. html
119 See Commonwealth Secretariat 1994, p. 70.
120 See Geldenhuys 1998, p. 94.
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brought up to contend that yet another African electorate had been let down
by the double standards of the international community.
A large part of the answer to this pressing question can be found in
considerations of the context within which these elections took place. It can
well be argued that context-specific factors carried disproportionate weight in
the decisions of both the IEC and the international community to give South
Africa's 1994 election the thumbs up.
Estimates put the total casualties of political violence since it erupted in
September 1984 at 20 000.121 In the run-up to the polls it once again
increased in intensity, and boiled over in tragic events like the Shell House
shootout and deaths in the confrontation between ANC protesters and the
police of the former homeland of Ciskei. So much therefore depended on a
successful outcome of the election that few dared to contemplate anything to
the contrary. Accordingly there was also a large amount of political pressure
on the IEC to declare the elections free and fair.122
Steven Friedman, head of the IEC's information analysis department at the
time refuted claims that a decision on the outcome of the election had been
taken in advance of the pol1.123According to him there is no such thing as a
perfect election. The free and fair criteria, he stated, should be an attempt to
establish whether the results of an election truly reflected the will of the
people. The IEC had a list of standards that ranged from human rights and
proper administration, but he nevertheless believed that any violation of these
would have to have a substantial impact on the outcome of the electoral
process before it could be declared null and void. Even so, he conceded that
a large part of the final decision would be political in nature. Should any of the
parties contest the outcome of the election or any aspect thereof, political
121 Henning, L. and Coetzer, A. 1994: The Independent Electoral Commission Journal for
Contemporary History Vol. 19 No.2 p. 216.
122 Stober, P. 1994: The pressure's on to declare the poll fair Weekly Mail & Guardian 22-28
April p. 5.
123 See Stober 1994, p. 5.
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intervention would have to take place to avert any complications. This was
indeed, according to the Weekly Mail & Guardian, also what had decided the
final outcome of the April 1994 election.124 It is alleged that after major
complaints of irregularities, the lEG chairperson, Judge Johan Kriegler, had to
abort a number of rules and procedures in order to reach a result. What all of
this amounted to, the paper contends, is that the election outcome was not an
numerical indication of party support, but rather the result of horse-trading
among the parties.
Such direct accusations are not to be found in observer reports, and it is
therefore unclear whether they viewed some of the proceedings in the same
light. The fact is that they were aware of a number of irregularities, which it
can be argued, would not have been tolerated in most of the more settled
democracies. It is the opinion of the author that most of the observer missions
felt the same urgency as the lEG for the process to work. The international
community, be it governments, IGOs or NGOs, have been campaigning
decades for the abolition of apartheid, and the election was for many the
culmination of their efforts over many years. For some of the observers who
were personally involved in the struggle, a successful poll was also a personal
quest.
Another factor, less altruistic, that cannot be overlooked is the notion of
international prestige. A telling remark by an international observer, who for
obvious reasons wanted to remain anonymous, was that "Our governments
want the election to succeed. They need a policy success after Bosnia."125
Since the April '94 election was been the most observed ever, a failure in the
conduct of the poll, would have been an indictment against the practice of
international observation, and the organisations conducting it. Especially in
the light of the fumbled 1992 Angolan elections that catapulted the country
into its worst period of civil war ever, it was vital for the UN to re-establish
some of its lost prestige in this field.
124 See Weekly Mail & Guardian 6 - 12 May 1994, p. 20.
125 See Stober 1994, p. 5.
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For the above reasons the author argues that the major international observer
missions used the same lenient standard as the IEC to establish whether the
election had been conducted in a legitimate fashion. The common measure
used by both groups was: "Did the election outcome reflect the will of the
South African people?" In the process both had to bend backwards to ensure
that this has was indeed the case. The contextual factors eventually
outweighed those of good electoral conduct. The Economist comments with
reference to the 1994 elections that "sometimes a satisfactory result is more
important than an election that meets technical standards of fairness." In this
specific case they contend that "the monitors wisely kept their criticisms to
themselves.F"
2.2.2 Professional Conduct
The observation of an election of the magnitude of the South Africa's 1994
election required an extraordinary effort. Being the most observed election in
history did not necessarily mean that it would also be the best co-ordinated.
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, large numbers can in some instances
complicate, rather than support an electoral process.
Although the four inter-governmental organisations, as well as their non-
governmental partners and representatives of individual governments
maintained their separate identities during the election period, the co-
ordination of the international observation effort fell on the shoulders of
UNOMSA. This request to co-ordinate the process together with the IEC
came from the South African Transitional Executive Council in late December
1993. Although the IEC contributed in a number of ways, the bulk of the co-
ordination effort was the responsibility of UNOMSA.
The three bodies created subsequent to the request formed the backbone of
UNOMSA's operations. The Co-ordinating Committee of the four heads of
mission, chaired by the U.N.'s special representative, met on a weekly basis
126 The Economist 1997: Seeing that its all fair and above board August 23rd p. 30.
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to discuss matters concerning preparations for the elections and other
responsibilities of the IGO missions. The Technical Task Force (TIF) was
chaired by the Head of the Electoral Division of the U.N. and staffed by the
electoral experts of the four missions. Their brief was to scrutinise the IEC's
preparations and to assist with advice where required. The Joint Operations
Unit (JOU) was responsible for the actual deployment of observer groups to
the field and all practical arrangements relating to them. To facilitate this
effort, a joint operations room was created to monitor all reports coming in
from the various observer missions during the voting days.127 In this way
information that was gathered by a specific mission were made available for
the benefit of other missions, and consequently contributed to the overall
efficacy of all observer teams.
Since all four IGO's had an extended presence in the country since at least
1992, the new contingent of observers that arrived after the passing of
Security Council Resolution 894 were not completely left to their own devices.
The fact that they were briefed, made their entry to the process much
smoother than what would have been the case otherwise. Short-term
observers from international NGO's and individual governments that co-
operated with UNOMSA, also benefited from the established data-base that
had been built up by the respective long-term missions. Some of the better
established electoral NGOs like IFES and the NDl chose to operate
separately from UNOMSA. Both have had a presence well in advance to the
election and could therefore draw on their own experience and resources. Co-
operation between these groups and intergovernmental organisations
occurred mainly on an ad hoc basis.
A problem that persisted right throughout the election campaign was the
uncertainty with regard to the exact role that international observers had to
play.128Despite the mandate under which they were observing the elections,
there still was confusion about whether members of the respective missions
127 See Commonwealth Secretariat 1994, p. 4.
128 See Anglin 1995, p. 534.
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should regard themselves as observers or monitors. As has been indicated in
the conceptual clarification of Chapter 1, these concepts encompass two
distinctive activities. Some regarded their brief as being restricted to the
observation of election-related occurrences, reporting perceived
transgressions and eventually delivering a verdict on the legitimacy of the
process in its entirety, while others did not share this minimalist view, and
maintained that their role should be more than mere spectators to the
process. The latter argued that observation should be combined with
guidance and assistance to officials of the host country. This they believed
was essential, especially in a country that had no previous experience of
conducting an election of this magnitude.129 According to Anglin, many
envisaged themselves as "political actors influencing the course of events in
constructive ways".130 Yet, many of the functions that were performed by
observers in the run-up and during the election campaign amounted to
monitoring, and many observers therefore also regarded themselves as
such.!" The official line from UNOMSA was nevertheless that it was
mandated to observe and report on the run-up to the election and the election
itself. UN observers were to refrain from mediating, but could assist, if called
upon to do so. The special representative of the UN Secretary General during
the April '94 elections, Lakhdar Brahimi, summarised it by saying that he
viewed the U.N.'s role in SA as "preventative diplomacy and international
assistance to a political process, which is different from the peacekeeping and
peacemaking role that the UN usually plays.',132
In his assessment of the impact that election observers had on the electoral
process, Anglin contends that the mere presence of international observers
did not necessarily facilitate a climate for free political participation. Although
their presence was critical in a couple of instances, it became less of a
deterrent the longer they were present in the country. Another possible reason
for this can be found in one of the most common complaints that local
129 See Geldenhuys 1998, p. 92.
130 See Anglin 1995, p. 534.
131 See Geldenhuys 1998, p. 92.
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observers had about their foreign counterparts, the observation that many
observers were keen to avoid potential danger areas. 133 According to these
accounts, apart from the fact that the UN sometimes refused their observers
permission to dangerous areas, they were also not allowed to remain in
townships after 17h30. It is Anglin's opinion that the dramatic decline in
violence at the end of the campaign therefore had little to do with their
presence.
A more substantial contribution by international missions, he argues, was the
reporting of their findings to the responsible authoritles.!" The extent to which
observer groups were requested to verify the activities of monitoring bodies
like the IEC, IBA and IMC, was a special feature of their responsibilities.
Unlike the international NGOs, IGOs were not obliged to share their findings
with the IEC. They nevertheless confronted the commission on a number of
occasions with regard to concerns they had with regard to the evolution of the
process. According to the UN Special Representative Brahimi, the IEC were
'very appreciative of this' and welcomed the views of the respective observer
missions. This was also reflected in the IEC's final report on the election,
where they expressed their gratitude towards international observers and
missions for their "invaluable advice and support'.l"
2.2.3 Observer Impartiality
Most incumbent authoritarian governments are generally opposed to the
participation of international observers in first democratic elections. Knowing
full well that all observers come from pro-democracy institutions that have
stood at the forefront in campaigns against their policies, incumbent
governments often try to avoid or limit their impact on the electoral process as
far as possible.
132 De Villiers, H. 1994: Peaceful Presence People Dynamics April, p. 11.
133 Scott, C. 1994: I spy with my little eye: Something beginning with an X Leadership Vol. 13
No 2, p. 65.
134 See Anglin 1995, p. 535.
135 See The Independent Electoral Commission 1994, p. 13.
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The National Party Government showed the same inclination when it was first
confronted with the question of international assistance for the April '94
elections. Initially Pretoria took a hard-line and insisted that observers would
not be required since it believed that South Africans should be in charge of
their own destiny. The lack of legitimacy that the NP Government enjoyed
from the majority of the South African population, however, prompted the ANC
and a delegation led by Archbishop Desmond Tutu to intensify their appeals
for the presence of an international observer contingent. As has been
indicated earlier, the allayment of government fears by a special UN task
force, together with the untenable security climate that had arisen in the wake
of the Boipatong shooting, eventually convinced the government to give in to
these requests. Although at the outset they were only peace-monitors, their
mandate was later expanded to include election observation.
The general attitude of local pro-democracy groups was therefore welcoming
towards the international observer presence, with government being the only
party watching it with a cautious eye. Research done in the run-up to the
election and on election day itself indicated that the largest section of the
general public also viewed their presence favourably. 136 Only a quarter of
South Africans thought that that the foreign presence made little or no impact
on the process, while an almost insignificant percentage believed that their
presence was harmful. Of those doubtful about the accomplishments of
foreign observers, about 55% was white and only 13% black. In the light of
the above it can therefore be argued that despite some suspicion from
government, international observers enjoyed the trust and confidence of the
majority of South Africans. The task of having to establish its credibility as an
impartial actor was consequently less demanding than has been the case in
earlier instances. Compared to experiences in the Zambian general election
of 1991 where observers were labelled by the Kaunda-government as
participants in an "international imperialist piot," or the 1992 Angolan elections
136 Moller, V. and Hanf, T. 1995: Learning to Vote: Voter Education in South Africa's 1994
Elections Durban: Indicator Press p. 27.
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where their presence were simply ignored by UNITA, the attainment of
credibility was therefore fairly straightforward.
A review of the international literature indicates that once credibility has been
established, observer missions should not concern themselves solely with
observation. They also have an important capacity building function to
perform. Since international expertise and technology cannot be guaranteed
for all future elections, it becomes essential for a country to create its own
impartial observation capacity. At this level foreign observers can make an
invaluable contribution. Firstly it can provide advice and technical assistance
to the host country's election authorities. This was indeed the case in the April
1994 elections, where millions of rands were made available for the electoral
effort.137 The second requirement quoted in the literature is the need for co-
operation between international and local observers. With regard to this
second requirement, it appears that there was some room for improvement.
Anglin remarks that a lack of co-operation with NGO observers, especially
those from South Africa, was a major shortcoming. He contends that
compared to other observation efforts in the recent past, the South African
experience did not feature a 'close and mutually beneficial relationship'
between IGOs and domestic observer groups. It is, however, his belief that a
large part of the blame should be apportioned to a lack of preparedness on
the part of the National Election Observer Network (NEON), the largest local
observer orqantsatlon.F" Shortly before the election it went on a massive
national recruitment drive and eventually managed to acquire the services of
50 000 independent observers which were to observe the approximately 9
000 polling statlons.P" Within a period of three weeks NEON had to establish
an administrative infrastructure and train all 50 000 recruits. The end result of
this hurried attempt was that some observers had only two days of training
that ended less than 48 hours before the opening of the polls. During the
137 See Geldenhuys 1998, p. 86-87
138 See Anglin 1995, p. 543.
139 See Scott 1994, p. 61.
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election, the organisation was also hit by observers who refused to continue
their duties unless they got their salaries from the IEC.14o The Commission,
however, denied that it had promised them salaries.
Local observers on the other hand complained about the cautious approach of
their foreign counterparts. The fact that international missions were hesitant to
deploy their observers in potentially dangerous areas, contributed to a
significant increase in the workload of local observers.
Whereas IGOs co-operated more closely than ever before in the April '94
elections, a regression in terms of relations with NGOs had, according to
Anglin, taken place during the same period.
3. SECTION B: THE 1999
OBSERVATION EFFORT
INTERNATIONAL ELECTION
3.1 ThePoliticalClimate
The South African political environment has undergone a fundamental
transformation since the April 1994 elections. Probably two of the most
influential documents accepted in this period have been a new constitution
and a bill of rights that protects the democratic rights of all South African
citizens.l" The cumulative effect of these documents has been legislative
changes aimed at levelling the political playing field.
Although far-reaching, most of these changes occurred purely on an
institutional level. Since these were one-sided measures, initiated in
parliament, we were told very little about the extent to which the democratic
values that they reflect have taken root in ordinary South Africans and those
individual legislators who have passed them. It is here where the importance
140 Henning and Coetzer 1994, p. 203.
141 South African Constitution, 1996: The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa
http://www.constitution.org.za/b34b/b34b_con.htm
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-also to the international community - of South Africa's June 1999 elections
lies. Whereas the 1994 elections has been described as South Africa's
liberation elections, the 1999 poll has been termed by scholars as its
consolidation elections.l'" The latter was to provide the best opportunity so far
to establish whether most South Africans had come to accept the democratic
rules of the game. When viewed in this context, it can be asserted that the
1999 elections should be regarded just as important, if not more important
than the first round in 1994.
Also significant is Africa's record on the way it conducted second elections
has been dismal thus far. According to Bratton, it is not so much the quantity,
but the quality of second elections on the continent that is cause for
concern."? Research conducted by him has indicated that democratised
countries in Africa have experienced fewer acceptable elections in the period
1995-1997 (30%) than in the first round of democratising elections in the
period 1990-1994 (55,5%). With the exception of Kenya and Cameroon where
there have been a deliberate tampering with votes, he asserts that incumbent
parties have not meddled with rules of political participation as a means to
retain power. Problems with regard to political participation were in most
instances due to hasty preparations, insufficient systems of voter education
and outdated voter rolls.144
Most irregularities, he contends, arose from attempts to manipulate the rules
of political competition. One such example has been the disqualification of
former Zambian president, Kenneth Kaunda, from participation in his country's
legislative elections due to his Malawian ancestry. Another more recent
instance pertaining to the alteration of political rules has been in Namibia
where the ruling South West African Peoples Organisation (SWAPO), with its
large parliamentary majority changed the constitution to provide for a third
142 Bro Thuetsad, A. and Seich, C. 1999: What do we mean by free and fair elections? EISA
Election Update 99 NO.2, p. 7.
143 See Bratton 1998, p. 57.
144 See Bratton 1998, p. 57.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
71
term in office for President Sam Nuiorna.!" According to Bratton, examples
like these underline the need for bringing about genuine political competition
in Africa. This he regards as the biggest challenge for democratic reform in
Africa, noting that although the principle of broad participation has become
widely accepted, the same cannot be said about the rules for open political
contest.!"
Seen within the wider African context, it is therefore understandable why
scholars in the field of democratic consolidation have been looking forward
with anticipation to witness the conduct of South Africa's June 1999 elections.
Was the South African miracle, as many liked to refer to it, going to last or
was it going to follow the same declining trend established elsewhere in
Africa?
When assessing the conduct of the 1999 elections, it is important to take
cognisance of the legal framework within which it operated. Five pieces of
legislation governed the conduct of the 1999 electoral process. These were
the Constitution that was approved by the Constitutional Court in September
1996; the Public Funding of Represented Political Parties Act of 1997 that
governed the funding of political parties; the Independent Broadcasting
Authority Act of 1993 that had to had to ensure fair exposure by the by the
broadcasting media, the Electoral Commission Act of 1996, and the Electoral
Act of 1998.147
The Constitution provided for the conduct of the 1999 elections according to
the stipulations of the interim constitution that preceded it. The Independent
Electoral Commission Act of 1993, as amended in 1996, in turn provided for
the permanent establishment of an electoral commission that inherited the
name and logo of its temporary predecessor of 1994 campaign. The new IEC
145 Interview conducted with David Pottie
146 See Bratton 1998, p. 57.
147 EISA, 1999: A Handbook of South African Electoral Laws and Regulations 1999
EISA: Johannesburg, p. 3.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
72
was to be independent and charged with the strengthening of constitutional
democracy and the promotion of a democratic electoral process.!" Other new
obligations that the commission was required to perform under the amended
act, was the compilation of a new voters role, the demarcation of wards for
local government and polling stations, the further review of legislation and the
conduct of a programme of extensive voter educatlon.!" An important feature
of the new act was that although it provided authority to adjudicate disputes, it
did not afford the commission adjudication and monitoring divisions.P? In
future all decisions by the IEC and disagreements regarding the electoral
process were to be presented before the Electoral Court that had the same
status as the Supreme Court.l'" It was no longer responsible for the
certification of the process, and consequently the act did not make any
provision for a monitoring division in the IEC. Monitoring, instead, would
become the responsibility of provincial monitoring panels that were to be
appointed by the IEC in consultation with provincial NGO forums.152
The Electoral Act, passed in 1998, made specific provision for the observation
of the election by both local and international observers. Articles 84 and 85
expressly deal with the accreditation of observers. Article 84 states that the
accreditation of observers must promote conditions that will be 'conducive to a
free and fair election', requiring observers to be impartial and independent of
'any registered party or candidate contending the election.153 It is expected of
all observers to subscribe to a code, governing the conduct of all observers.
Article 85 pertains to jurisdiction and allows observers to observe proceedings
related to voting, the counting of the votes, and matters concerning the
determination and declaration of the election results.l'"
148 See EISA 1999, p. 11.
149 Lodge, T. 1999: Consolidating Democracy: South Africa's Second Popular Election
EISA: Johannesburg, p. 22.
150 See Lodge 1999, p. 22.
151 See EISA 1999, p. 15.
152 See Lodge 1999, p. 22.
153 The Electoral Act No. 73 of 1998, p. 54.
154 See the Electoral Act, p. 56.
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International observers were once again invited to observe the South African
elections of 1999. This time around it was not the government who extended
the invitation, but the IEC, who felt that the international presence could add
to the international legitimacy of the country's electoral process.!" The
mandate of observer groups was however much more restricted than was the
case in 1994. Whereas the mandate of observers in the 1994 elections
bordered on those responsibilities which are usually associated with monitors
(verification, confidence building and low level mediation), the 1999 mandate
was one purely of observation in which the international community was
requested merely to observe and assess polling and counting on election
day.156
In total about 350 international observers, from a variety of IGO, NGO and
diplomatic backgrounds, participated in the observation of the election (see
Table 4.2). 157The largest inter-governmental group was the OAU with a
contingent of 60 observers, followed by the Commonwealth Observer Group
with 22 members and the African Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
having 4 observers. For the first time an official SADC Observer Group also
witnessed South African electoral proceedings. Their efforts were a
continuation of the efforts of the SADC Electoral Commissions Forum, that
had been launched almost a year earlier in Cape Town.158According to David
Pottie, senior researcher at the Electoral Institute of South Africa (EISA),
which also co-ordinates SADC's observation efforts, the organisation intended
155 Interview Tselane Mokuena and Alex Msitshana
156 Response to questionnaire sent to Stefanie Luthy, Deputy Coordinator/Chief of
Operations, United Nations Electoral Assistance Secretariat in Johannesburg, South Africa,
24 June 1999
157 IEC 1999: List of accredited institutions/organisations to observe the 1999 elections,
obtained from the IEC, 24 June 1999
158 Business Day Online, 1998: SADC launches electoral body,
http://www.bday.co.za/98/07/28/world/w20.htm 2/12/1999
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to be present at all five elections that were to take place in the. SADC region
during 1999.159
Table 4.2: Foreign Observers in South Africa's 1999 Legislative Elections
Type of Organisation Name of Organisation Number of
Observers
(where
available)
IGOs Commonwealth Observer Group 22
Organisation of African Unity 60
African Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP) 4
SADC 15
NGO's, Lobbies and Other IFES 16
Electoral Institutions AWEPA 36
NDl 30
IRI 9
Independent National Electoral Commission
of Nigeria 5
Jurado de Nacional de Elecciones - Peru 1
Governmental Embassy of the Russian Federation 7
Representatives Embassy of Switzerland n/a
High Commission of India 10
Embassy of Japan 6
British High Commission 23
Republic of Angola 4
Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany 4
Royal Netherlands Embassy 6
High Commission of Namibia 6
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia 1
Embassy of the Democratic Republic Algeria 2
Embassy of France 5
Embassy of the United States of America 78
High Commission of Nigeria 2
159 See interview conducted with David Pattie
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Of the larger established electoral NGOs the IFES, NDl and IRI once again
participated in the observation effort, but like its IGO counterparts in far
smaller numbers than in 1994. Another prominent observer group, also
observing South Africa's general elections for the second time, was AWEPA
(European Parliamentarians for Africa) who sent a 40-member delegation,
consisting of members from 11 European and 11 African nations.
A last group of foreign observers were those who represented individual
governments. Observers from the last-mentioned group were mainly
forthcoming from embassies of their respective countries.
Most of the missions mentioned above, arrived only shortly before the actual
election was due to start. Compared to the controversy surrounding the IEC
and the subsequent resignation of its chairperson only months before the
election date, the actual polling day was fairly uneventful. Since the Electoral
Commission Act was passed in October 1996, only three years ahead of the
1999 election, the organisation of the election was due to be a hurried affair.
Six months after the act had been passed the commission's five
commissioners, with Judge Johan Kriegler as its chairperson, were appointed.
At year-end 1997, the Chief Electoral Officer, Prof. Mandla Mchunu was
appointed, and only in April 1998 the commission began hiring subordinate
layers of rnanaqers."? In effect, the IEC's national bureaucracy only started to
function in January 1999.
The centrepiece of controversy that had dogged the lEG right through the
preparatory phase of the elections, was the registration of voters. In April
1998 Judge Kriegler presented Mangosutho Buthelezi, Minister of Home
Affairs with the Electoral Bill. A controversial stipulation of the relevant was its
insistence on the possession of bar-coded identity documents as a
requirement for entry on the common voters role. Kriegler suggested that
160 See Lodge 1999, p. 25.
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such a proviso would curb possible instances of electoral fraud.!" After the
bill had been approved by cabinet, a study by the Human Sciences Research
Council (HSRC), commissioned by the IEC, indicated that as many as 20% of
eligible voters were not in possession of bar-coded ID documents. A
subsequent study by the Centre for Policy Studies, and the results of the
Opinion 99 survey, released in November 1998, both supported the results
provided by the HSRC.162 An exclusion of these voters, according to the
reports, could have amounted to the disenfranchisement of a significant part
of South Africa's voting population. The results of the HSRC survey moved
Kriegler to reverse his view on bar-coded IDs in the last quarter of 1998.163
The ANC however decided to continue supporting the legislation as it has
been presented to the minlster.'?' Home Affairs maintained that there were
shortcomings in the methodology of the HSRC poll that grossly inflated the
number of potential voters. It was confident that it could address the backlog
that existed according to its figures. 165
In response to the subsequent enactment of the Electoral Bill, both the
National Party and Democratic Party failed in their court bids to have the bar-
coded ID stipulation declared unconstitutional. The registration process had a
shaky start, but gained momentum that eventually resulted in the registration
of 18,3 million voters.l'" Kriegler's confrontations with Home Affairs, however,
continued, and in a letter written to Deputy President Mbeki on 22 January
1999, he claimed that the IEC had lost its power to complete the voters' roll
free from government intervention.l'" Four days later Kriegler announced his
resignation and was replaced by dr. Brigalia Bam, Deputy Chairperson of the
161 See Lodge 1999, p. 27.
162 Barrell, H. 1999: One-in-four potential voters excluded Daily Mail and Guardian, May 7
http://www.sn .apc. org/wmail/issues/99050//N EWS29. html
163 See Lodge 1999, p. 27.
164 Sunday Times Online, 1999: Party Games and Alarming Truths
http://www.suntimes.co.za/suntimesarchive/1998/12/06/insightlin02.htm16/01 /2000
165 Sunday Times Online, 1999: More Guests Will Not Spoil Election Dish at Home Affairs
http://www.suntimes.co.za/suntimesarchive/1999/03/07/insightlin09.htm16/01 /2000
166 See Barrell 1999, http://www.sn.apc.org/wmail/issues/99050flNEWS29.html
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lEG shortly thereafter. From the point onwards relations between the lEG and
government started to normalise.l'"
The elections went ahead as planned on 2 June 1999 and was marked by a
68% voter turnout. Voting took place without any major incidents and with less
than half the number of complaints that was registered with the lEG in the
previous election. The only major problem on the day was the unexpected
high turnout in some wards, which was responsible for long queues, and
consequent extra voting materials that had to be delivered.169 Despite this,
Lodge asserts that in terms of procedure, the 1999 election effort was a vast
improvement on the 1994 attempt. He identifies the existence of the newly
compiled voters' roll as the greatest contributing factor.
All the international observation missions also agreed with the view expressed
by Lodge. Although most pointed to some aspects of concern (most notably
voter registration and voter education), all were unanimous in their
assessment that the election had been conducted in an acceptable fashion,
that it reflected the will of the South African people, and importantly also, that
it had been an improvement on the 1994 exercise.
From the above it is fairly clear that the political environment within which
June 1999 election took place, differed significantly from the 1994 scenario. It
can well be asked whether international observers also changed the nature of
their operations to be in sync with the new demands of election observation in
South Africa. In the following three subsections their observation effort will be
evaluated in terms of the same conditions that were used in Section A.
167 See Lodge 1999, p. 25.
168 See Lodge 1999, p. 50.
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3.2 Evaluation
3.2. 1 Electoral Standards
The best way to judge electoral standards in this context, is to compare the
criteria used for observer missions in 1999with those applied during the 1994
elections. Over the years, the term "free and fair" has become the buzzword in
electoral circles, but as has been indicated, it is rapidly loosing its popularity
among scholars who suggest that on its own it has become too superficial a
measure. This trend in thought has also been visible in the way observer
missions have assessed the conduct of the 1994 elections. Most of the
missions refrained from labelling the process "free and fair", but rather opted
for pronouncements that testified of considerations that gave thought to the
specific context within which the elections took place, without ignoring those
basic democratic values that underpin all democracies.
A sense of urgency had been evident among the overwhelming majority of
South Africans in the run-up to its first democratic election. Everyone,
including the IEC and the international community, knew that the stakes were
high. Undoubtedly this consideration played a major role in the way the
process was judged. It is the opinion of the author that disproportionate
attention had to be given to contextual factors in order for it to be declared
legitimate. Despite a vast number of irregularities the election was
nevertheless given the thumbs-up by all who were called upon to make an
assessment.
Apart from clashes between the UDM and ANC in Richmond, KwaZulu Natal,
the 1999 election campaign was conducted in a far more peaceful
atmosphere than in 1994. The stakes were not nearly as high in 1994
election, and it can therefore be asked whether the standards applied to judge
the recent election, especially those used by the international community,
were more stringent than the first time around.
1690, Grady, K. 1999: lEe battles to handle turnout Business Day Online
http://www.bday.co.za/99/0603/news/news1.htm 5/12/1999
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A useful starting point is to look at the standard conduct that the IEC was
required to observe. The Independent Electoral Commission Act of 1993
pertinently required of the IEC to certify whether the 1994 election was
substantially free and fair. The new act of 1996 differs in that the IEC is
required to ensure and promote conditions that are conducive to free and fair
elections."? In 1999 the IEC was, therefore, no longer required to make a
judgement on the freeness and fairness of the election. Instead it had to
promote the conditions that contributed to such a situation. Little is however
known about the content of the free and fair criteria within the South African
context.
According to Bra Theutsad and Seich, the concepts of free and fair had not
been clarified up till then in South African legislation. Although the
Constitution, Electoral Commission Act of 1996 and the Electoral Code of
Conduct use it in a number of instances, none of these documents clarify
what they mean by it. Since South African jurisprudence cannot provide an
answer (the 1999 election is the first under the new constitution), it is
therefore necessary to resort to the Electoral Court if clarity is needed on the
freeness and fairness of a specific action. Where, they ask, will the Electoral
Court go to find interpretations of these criteria? They suggest that some
answers can be found in a number of indirect prescriptions made in the
Constitution, Electoral Law and Electoral Code of Conduct, that by and large
correspond with international norms on the issue. These they suggest should
deserve sufficient attention when interpreting local differences on whether or
not an action falls within the scope of free and fair or not.!"
The UN, although only responsible for the observer co-ordination in the 1999
elections, also subscribes to internationally accepted standards when making
assessments about the freeness and fairness of an electoral process. These
are codified in documents like the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and
the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. Stefanie Luthy, Chief
170 See Bra Thuetsad and Seich 1999, p. 9.
171 See Bra Thuetsad and Seich 1999, p. 9.
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of Operations in the U.N. Electoral Assistance Secretariat's (UN-EAS) South
African co-ordination effort in 1999, however states that when an evaluation is
made, the local context has to be taken into account.
Asked about the electoral standard used by the Commonwealth Observer
Group in the 1999 elections, Lorna McClaren of the Commonwealth
Secretariat also insists that there is no such thing as an absolute free and fair
election.172 She believes that there will always be factors that detract from the
acceptability of the process as a whole. The challenge is to ensure that any
one or a combination of these factors do not substantially inhibit the freedom
of voters to express their preferences. Accordingly the Commonwealth
Observer Group's brief for the South African elections of 1999 was to observe
relevant aspects of the organisation and conduct of the National and
Provincial Elections in accordance with the law in South Africa.,,173In addition
it had to inspect all factors that might have had an impact on ability of voters
to express their preference freely. Although it had no executive role, the group
was free to make suggestions on procedural, institutional and others matters
that could contribute to the smooth running of the process. Ultimately it had to
establish whether the results reflected the will of the majority of South
Africans. According to its report to the Commonwealth Secretary General,
this was indeed the case in the June 1999 elections. Barring certain aspects,
such as a lack of sufficient voter education, logistical problems on voting day
and prescriptions with regard to party funding, it was found that the final result
was an accurate indication of the voting preferences of all South Africans.!"
The SADC Observer Group viewed its participation as part of a long-term
engagement aimed at democratic consolidation within the Southern African
region. Since the organisation is rooted in the subcontinent, the group
believes that its role is not in the first instance to evaluate the conduct of an
172 Interview conducted by Prof. Hennie Kotzé with Lorna McClaren
173 Commonwealth Secretariat, 1999: The National and Provincial Elections in South
Africa: The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group 2 June, Commonwealth
Secretariat: London, p. 2.
174 Commonwealth Secretariat 1999, p. 41.
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election in relation to international standards, but rather to encourage the
development of co-operation that will contribute to the improvement of
electoral processes in Southern Africa.175 Therefore it aims to function as a
capacity building resource that can provide both technical and evaluative
assistance to a host country. Although giving the conduct of the election a
positive evaluation, it nevertheless refrained from using the term free and fair.
Like the Commonwealth Observer Group it chooses to commend the efforts of
the IEC and state that in their opinion the result of the election was a 'fair
expression of the wishes of the people of South Africa.'
In a similar vein the OAU expressed its satisfaction with the outcome of the
election, asserting that the process by which South Africans expressed their
choices through the ballot box took place in a 'transparent, free and unfettered
atmosphere.'!" Other member missions falling under the JIOG also
expressed their satisfaction in a joint statement, remarking that the elections
constituted a positive step towards the consolidation of the South African
democracy.!"
AWEPA was the only major grouping that felt comfortable with the
pronouncing the freeness and the fairness of the process. In its statement on
2 June, it commended South Africans for the 'freedom of the process in
relation to the lack of censorship, intimidation coercion and restricted access
or opportunity' and the 'fairness of the process in relation to the guaranteed
secrecy and accessibility of the vote; equal treatment under the law and
transparency in the count.'?"
In the light of the above, it has been interesting to note that the overwhelming
majority of South African voters viewed the conduct of the elections in exactly
175 SADC Electoral Commissions Forum 1999: SADe Electoral Observation Missions:
Terms of Reference, Johannesburg: EISA, p. 2.
176 Press Release by the Organisation of African Unity, Johannesburg, 4 June 1999
177 See UN-EAS Press Release 1999
178 AWEPA, 1999: Statement on the 2 June 1999 South African Elections by Senator Jan-
Nico Scholten, President of AWEPA
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the same way.179In an exit poll conducted by the HSRC a total of 96% of
voters were of the opinion that the election procedures were conducted freely
and fairly. Significantly within the South African context is the fact that this
perception was shared across provincial and racial boundaries. Other
important findings were that 85% of voters believed that their vote was secret,
and 99% indicated that they did not experience any pressure to support a
particular political party. With regard to the convenience of the voting process
92% indicated that they were able to reach the polling station within an hour,
while just over half of the respondents waited for less than 30 minutes in
voting queues. In an overall assessment of the process, 84% of those
interviewed indicated that the entire electoral process was conducted in a
more professional way than in 1994. Also with regard to this view, there is no
difference in the perceptions of whites and blacks."?
The findings of the HSRC thereby confirm the pronouncements of the major
observer missions regarding the conduct of the election.
3.2.2 Professional Conduct
The UN was again requested by the IEC to co-ordinate and support the
international observation effort for its June 1999 elections. It accepted the
invitation, but did not designate any of its own observers to participate in the
actual observation of the process. According to Stefanie Luthy, Deputy Co-
ordinator/Chief of Operations of the United Nations UN-EAS mission for South
Africa's June 1999 elections, the UN finds this type of involvement least
intrusive to national sovereignty, but at the same time provides the benefits of
an international presence. According to Luthy the co-ordination provided by
the UN-EAS during the 1999 elections entailed much more than the mere
deployment of observers. It was the aim of the organisation to provide a co-
ordinated, harmonised professional approach to ensure a credible observation
effort. Additional tasks, therefore, included the provision of training and
179 Human Sciences Research Council, 1999: An Evaluation of South Africa's Second
Democratic Election Process - Preliminary Report 6 June, p. 6.
180 See HSRC Report 1999, pp. 16 - 17
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briefing to observers, and the organising of logistical support such as hotel
bookings, airport transfers, accreditation procedures, and the mapping of
visitation routes. 181
Observers that were part of the UN co-ordinated and trained observation
effort mainly represented inter-governmental organisations (OAU, SADC,
APC) and other representatives came from individual countries (Algeria,
Canada, Finland, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Sweden,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom). The group totalling 128, operated
within the framework of the Joint International Observer Group (JIOG) that
was co-ordinated by the UN-EAS. On Election Day the group was paired in
groups of two, and were deployed in all of the country's nine provinces to
observe voting, counting and collation in both rural and urban areas.!" This
method of deployment allowed the group to conduct random sampling
observation, which the UN-EAS believes gave it a reliable overview of the
process.
Apart from the UN-co-ordinated effort, the Commonwealth Observer Group
under the leadership of Scottish parliamentary Speaker, Sir David Steel, was
the other major observer mission that attracted the attention of the South
African media. Although it co-operated closely with the UN-EAS, it conducted
its observation effort separately from the UN body. Its members assembled in
Pretoria nine days before the poll and used the time to have a series of
meetingswith the IEC, political parties and other important stakeholders in the
process. On 28 May members of the group were paired in 10 two-person
teams and deployed to the nine provinces. The Chairperson and the
Secretariat team leader remained in Pretoria where the group had its base. It
also covered part of the North West Province. In the period before polling day
all teams travelled extensively to familiarise themselves with their deployment
areas. On the 31 May and 1 June the casting of special votes were witnessed,
181 See interview with Luthy
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and on 2 June voting was observed at 166 polling stations.l'" A debriefing
took place on 3 June and on 4 June members started to depart from the
South Africa.
Other organisations that operated separately from the UN-EAS were AWEPA
and IFES. Whereas AWEPA, a European parliamentarian lobbying group for
the African cause, had sent 400 observers for observation in 1994 elections, it
only designated a 40-member delegation to the 1999 elections. As had been
the case in previous observer efforts elsewhere in Africa, it believes that the
teamwork between its members, coming from 11 African and 11 European
countries, was a definite feature of its mission in South Africa. According to
the organisation's statement on departure, the group tried to interact as much
as possible with local observers.l'"
The IFES mission consisted of 12 members: six from Congolese civil society
organisations; three high-level government officials from the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC); and three members from IFES. The rationale
behind the composition of the team was to expose the Congolese officials to
the South African process, in the hope that with the experience gained, a
positive contribution could be made to the democratisation of the DRC.185 Its
mission was divided into three teams of four persons each, which were
deployed in the provinces of KwaZulu Natal, the Northern Province and the
Eastern Cape. Like most of the other missions, the IFES group also observed
the voting at 34 polling stations, the counting thereof and the consequent
transmission of the election results.
182 UN-EAS Press Release 1999: Statement by the Joint International Observer Group,
delivered on its behalf by Pres. Nicephore Soglo, former Head of the State of Benin, 4 June
1999
183 Commonwealth Secretariat, 1999: The National and Provincial Elections in South
Africa - 2 June 1999 Commonwealth Secretariat: London, pp. 3-4.
184 See AWEPA 1999, p. 7.
185 IFES Press Release, 1999: Declaration of the observation and training mission of the
Democratic Republic of Congo and IFES to the South African General Election of 2 June
1999,5 June
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Two features stand out with regard to the co-ordination of the 1999
international observer effort. The first is the drastic decrease in observer
numbers from an astounding 6 000 in the 1994 election, to a mere 350 in the
1999 election. The 1999 campaign certainly did not have the high
international profile that it had 5 years earlier, but when one looks at its
meaning within the context of democratic consolidation in Africa, it can be
asked whether the cause didn't justify a stronger international contingent.
Another noticeable aspect of the observation effort was the short period that
most of the missions stayed within the country. It is true that institutions like
the Commonwealth, AWEPA and the IFES had a presence in the country that
preceded the election, but the observers that were designated by their
respective organisations did not. Most of the observers arrived not more than
a week in advance of the election, and it can well be asked how much they
knew about grassroots politics in South Africa. It can be argued that briefings
at cocktail parties in Pretoria and three days in the field are insufficient to form
a clear picture of the dynamics at work beneath the public face of South
African politics.
Budgetary constraints are one possible explanation why observer teams
shrunk and their period of stay decreased since 1994. The fact that the
political environment within which the election took place was less intimidating
than in 1994 can also serve as reason for the smaller numbers and shorter
period of coverage. Much can however also be attributed to the mandate that
was given by the IEC to observer groups. The 1999 mandate limited
observers only to observing and assessing the conduct of polling and
counting on election day.186According to Stefanie LOthy, this mandate might
have been somewhat too limited. She contends that a group of long-term
international observation experts could have made a meaningful contribution
by observing the whole electoral cycle. However, she concedes that
professionalism in the practice of observation has grown in leaps and bounds
186 See questionnaire to Stefanie Luthy 1999
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since 1994, and it would therefore not be unthinkable to conduct a credible
observation effort with more economical means.
3.2.3 Observer Impartiality
One of the more disappointing aspects of the observation effort in the 1999
South African elections has been the lack of co-operation between local and
international observers. Having been identified as a shortcoming in the 1994
elections, it is therefore the more disappointing that little progress was
achieved on this level.
According to the UN-EAS, the short time span within which it had to operate
did not allow for the kind of co-operation with local observers that is
customary in international observation mlssions.!" Observers that were part
of the JIOG, were, however, briefed on their arrival to South Africa by,
amongst others, Ashley Green-Thompson, co-ordinator of the umbrella
organisation for local observers, SACSOC (South African Civil Society
Observations Coalition), and instructed to communicate with national
observers while performing their duties.
SACSOC, consisting of 10 000 local observers, was formed during the first
quarter of 1999 as a co-ordinated initiative of South African civil society
orqanlsations.l'" At a meeting held in February 1999 it was decided that the
focus of their objectives would be twofold: Firstly it had to establish a
relationship of critical engagement with the IEC, and secondly it had to report
on both the real and perceived problems that might arise during the electoral
process. It was envisaged that by these means the South African citizenry
would be represented by civil society in the observation of the process.
Although the South African Catholic Bishops Conference (SACBC) hosted the
programme at a national level, lead agencies in the 9 provinces were made
responsible for its implementation. These responsibilities included the
187 See questionnaire to Stefanie Luthy 1999
188 South African Civil Society Observation Coalition, 1999: 1999 Election Report, p. 8.
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recruitment, training, deployment and supervision of observers, as well as the
creation of provincial organisational structures.
Due to financial restraints, all polling stations could not be observed. Despite
these limitations the organisation nevertheless succeeded in covering 50% of
the polling stations and a considerable amount of the counting stattons.I" All
SACSOC observers were given structured forms according to which they had
to evaluate the witnessed procedures. In the final instance 87% of all
observers remarked that the process was free and fair or free and fair with
minor irregularities. When asked to give a global assessment of the process,
only one percent gave it a negative evaluatton.l'"
SACSOC, by far the largest national observation organisation, co-operated
closely with other accredited organisations. This, according to their final
report, often required co-ordination to ensure that a duplication of activities did
not take place. Green-Thompson, however, feels that hopes for a co-
operative effort between local observers and their international counterparts
never rnaterialised.l'" He is specifically critical of the UN-EAS decision not to
send observers to so-called trouble spots. The result of this was that only 13%
of their international contingent was deployed in KwaZulu Natal, a province
that has become notorious for its political instability.
This lack of co-operation is disappointing. Despite the fact that international
observers could have benefited significantly from local knowledge, it is also a
setback for South African initiatives to gain international experience and the
expertise needed to establish a strong home-grown observer capacity.
Therefore it seems that in future, the onus will rest largely on the shoulders of
South African to create their own capacity in this field.
189 See South African Civil Society Observation Coalition 1999, p. 14.
190 See South African Civil Society Observation Coalition 1999, p. 14.
191 Interview with Ashley Green-Thompson on Wednesday, 18 August 1999
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One such initiative that should be commended is the SADC Electoral
Commissions Forum, which aspires to the strengthening of co-operation on
electoral matters in SADC region. This forum, coordinated by EISA is
committed to the development of capacity within the SADC region to observe
one another's elections on a sustainable basis. According to David Pottie this
movement should not be seen as resistance against activities of organisations
like UN or the Commonwealth, but rather as a capacity building initiative
aimed at democratic consolidation in the region.
4. REPRISE
The aim of this chapter has been to assess the activities of international
election observers thus far in South Africa. The discussion has been
structured to provide the political and legislative context that is required for an
assessment of the three aspects (electoral standards, professional conduct,
observer impartiality) identified in Chapter 3.
It has been indicated that the background against which the two observations
efforts took place differed significantly. In 1994 the atmosphere prior to the
election was pregnant with conflict, bound to erupt with the slightest
provocation. Miraculously this never happened, and contrary to many
expectations the country experienced its most peaceful period in months. The
election was declared 'substantially free and fair', despite serious electoral
irregularities. It has been asserted that a verdict to the contrary could have
been catastrophic. Although being labelled 'election observers', the duties
performed by members of international missions bordered on those tasks
usually associated with election monitors. These included peace-monitoring,
technical assistance, low-level mediation on the ground, and the verification of
the process as a whole.
Despite the murder of KwaZulu Natal's controversial UDM leader, Sifiso
Nkabinde, and other isolated incidents of violence, the run-up to the 1999
election was less conflict-laden than in 1994. The wars that were fought were
between government and IEC officials on electoral particulars like the issue of
bar-coded ID documents. These tensions eventually led to the resignation of
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the Judge Kriegler, Chairperson of the IEC, 5 months prior to the election. The
reins were taken over by Dr. Brigalia Bam whose relationship with
government was less conflictual than that of her predecessor, who was very
particular in his insistence on the commission's institutional independence.
Bam steered the organisation through an electoral process that scholars and
observers alike have described as a vast improvement on the 1994 effort.
International observers played a diminished role in 1999. New legislation
passed in 1996 and 1998 provided for the possibility of election observation,
but to a more limited extent than was the case in the previous election.
Whereas the 1994 mandate allowed observers to follow the development of
the process over a period of months, they were only requested by the IEC to
observe activities on Election Day in 1999. Some involved in the provision of
foreign assistance felt that this mandate might have been too limited to
perform their duties satisfactorily.
Subsequent to each of the two background sketches, an assessment was
made of the three central requirements for the conduct of a successful
observation effort.
With regard to the first, electoral standards, it was suggested that any
measure judging the acceptability of an election should take into account not
only basic democratic standards, but also the context within which these have
to be applied. It was found that to a large extent this measure was used in
both the 1994 and 1999 elections. Significant has been the fact that the major
missions, with the exception of AWEPA, refrained from calling the elections
outright free and fair. In some instances it has been qualified as 'substantially
free and fair', but the general tendency has been to refer to it in terms of the
extent that it reflected the will of the South African people. Such a measure is
clearly context bound. In both instances observers judged the results as
mirroring the choice of the majority. It must, however, be contended that in
1994, contextual factors played a disproportionately large role in the decision
to declare the election free and fair. Any decision to the contrary could have
been disastrous for the country's future prospects. Although observers could
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only make a judgement on Election Day proceedings in 1999, it judged
activities pertaining to this aspect of the process as a vast improvement on
1994.
Two features that distinguished the1994 observation effort from that in 1999,
was the number of foreign observers present and their duration of stay. While
the 1994 elections had the reputation of being the most observed in history,
the number of observers in 1999 were relatively small. Since the observer
mandates differed for the two elections, the period that observers spent in
South Africa was also much shorter in comparison to the 1994 effort. Both
these factors impinged on the co-ordination of the participating observer
groups.
In 1994 UNOMSA, the UN observer mission in South Africa, was requested
by the IEC to co-ordinate observer activities of IGOs and international NGOs.
It had the advantage of having been present in the country for almost two
years prior to the election and could therefore draw on its experience and that
of other organisations which were part of the Joint International Observer
Group. Some of the major electoral NGO's like the NDl and IFES chose to
observe the campaign separately from UNOMSA's administration.
In 1999 the UN was once again requested to provide coordination of
international observer efforts. Obliged by this request was the UN-EASwhose
officials arrived just more than a month before the election date. The majority
of international observers co-ordinated by the UN-EAS were delegated by
IGOs, while most of the international NGOs, like IFES, NDl and IRI chose to
function separately from UNOMSA. The Commonwealth, although
cooperating closely with UNOMSA, also conducted its effort independently
from that of the UN agency.
With regard to the mandate under which missions had to operate, there has
been far more clarity than had been the case in 1994. As has been
mentioned, some confusion did exist about the extent to which observers
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could intervene in the process. The 1999 mandate provided by the lEG made
it clear that observers were only to witness proceedings on polling day.
A last important aspect that has been assessed was the level of cooperation
that exists between foreign and local observers. It has been found that at this
level there is still ample room for improvement. Meaningful cooperation
between international and the local observer groups was sadly lacking in
1994, and according to accounts of 1999 election, the same seemed to have
been the case. Future attention will have to be given to this aspect.
Some lessons are to be learned from the two South African experiences with
democratic elections. The following chapter will contain concluding remarks
and a number of recommendations and suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER 5
International Election Observation: Its Future in South
African Elections?
1. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Hardly any election has grabbed international attention as much as did South
Africa's first democratic election on 27 April 1994. For a few days in April 1994
foreign eyes were turned to the much-maligned country at the southern tip of
Africa that finally seemed to be getting it right. The sight of people dancing in
the streets, voting queues snaking around street corners, and an elderly
woman being pushed to the polling station on a wheelbarrow to cast her very
first vote, will be etched into the memories of the millions of viewers.
The 1994 election was a triumph for all South Africans who were burdened
and oppressed under the system of apartheid. At another level it was a victory
for all those in the international community who actively campaigned against
the policies of apartheid South Africa. The role that foreign organisations and
institutions played in the dismantling of apartheid can not be underestimated.
The prominence that South Africa's domestic policies received within these
bodies over the past decades, ensured that the eventual liberation of the
South African black majority was celebrated far beyond South African
borders. It was therefore to be expected that, with the 1994 election being the
last hurdle to political liberation, the international community was eager to be
present to witness South Africans passing it.
This was indeed the case. In 1992 the first IGOs moved into the country to
establish their respective observer missions. In the light of the fragile political
climate that was pervading the country, their initial mandate was solely to
conduct peace monitoring. After the De Klerk government's initial resistance
to the idea of foreign election observation, the green light was given in
December 1993 for an international presence at the polls. In the wake of this
decision a variety of IGOs, international NGOs and governments entered the
country to become part of what was to become the most observed election in
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history. It is estimated that at the height of the observation effort the number
of observers was in excess of 6000.
The June 1999 election was characterised by much less international
attention than in 1994. Events in Kosovo and East-Timor overshadowed all
events elsewhere in the world, and thus also South Africa's second
democratic election. It has, however, been argued in this paper that although
having had a lower profile in the international media, the country's 1999
election was of no less importance than that of 1994. Its significance was in
the fact that election would have given the most comprehensive indication so
far of the extent of democratic consolidationwithin the country.
It is for this reason that the IEC once again invited international observers to
witness the conduct of the June 1999 elections. According its Director:
International Liaison, Tselane Mokuena, it was "important to have an
international presence to attest to the strengthening of our democracy." She
believes that their attendance had a definite legitimising effect on the process.
But apart from giving it international credibility, it can be asked whether the
practice of election observation benefited the South African electoral process.
It has been the objective of this paper to assess whether this has been the
case. Within the extent of four chapters, the author has attempted to evaluate
the contributions that have been made by foreign observers in South Africa's
two democratic elections.
Chapter 1 has charted the course of action taken by the author. The chapter
consisted of three main components. Firstly it contained a statement of the
research question that was to be addressed in this paper. It was asserted that
the central concern of this paper would be to ascertain the achievements of
international observers in South Africa's two democratic elections.
The second important element of Chapter 1 was the provision of a rationale
for the study to be conducted. Cultivating a democratic culture and trust in the
institutions that promote it is not something that can be accomplished
overnight. In the opinion of the author, the contributions of international
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observers during elections can assist in the building of capacity and trust in
local electoral processes. The rationale of this study is thus to determine
whether this can be said of observation efforts in South African elections.
A last important component of the first chapter was the methodological
approach to the paper. Although international literature was reviewed in
Chapters 2 and 3, very few comparisons were made between the international
and South African experiences in election observation. International literature
has rather been used to extract a number of good electoral practices that the
author argues should be of application to observer missions in South African
elections. The nature is of this paper is, therefore, essentially descriptive,
rather than comparative.
Chapter 2 concerned itself with the relative importance of elections as a
measure of democratic reform. A question mark has been put behind the
extent to which elections can be regarded as a true measure of democratic
accomplishment. The author has stated his view that elections in and by
themselves can never be used as a single focus by those who want to assess
the level of democratic reform. He believes that the way in which they are
conducted is nevertheless a valuable indicator of the extent to which reform
has taken place. The responsibility to scrutinise this conduct fall on the
shoulders of election observers
The remainder of Chapter 2 focussed on the types of institutions that conduct
election observation and the functions that they perform. It has been indicated
that initially IGOs were the primary practitioners of international election
observation. The magnitude of post-colonial elections and the resources
required by observer missions to cover them has made IGOs the obvious
choice to do it. As the rate of countries being democratised became more
rapid in the late eighties, it became increasingly difficult, even for large IGOs
like UN, to finance their observer missions. This opened the door for the NGO
sector to playa more prominent role in the field of electoral assistance. Today
international and national NGOs play a significant role in the conduct of
elections. Their value lies in the fact that most are specialising in some aspect
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of electoral conduct. This has allowed the U.N. to perform its new function of
co-ordinating major IGO and NGO missions by means of joint international
observer group (JIOG's).
The objective of the third chapter has been twofold. Since it has been
contended that international observation might in some instances amount to
the violation of an independent country's sovereignty, a justification for
international election observation as opposed to domestic observation had to
be established. While this complaint was lodged in most instances by
incumbent authoritarian regimes, there is also growing resentment among
domestic pro-democracy groups against the practice of international election
observation. For this reason the second objective has been to review the
complaints by pro-democracy groups and the responses thereto. From these
the author has isolated three conditions deemed necessary for the conduct of
meaningful international election observation.
With regard to the first objective of chapter 2, it has been contended that
sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention are subject to the
requirements of international law. Election observation seeks to endorse the
international right of people to govern themselves, which is to be found in key
international documents such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the UN General
Assembly Resolution on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of
Periodic and Genuine Elections.
A review of the criticism levelled against international observers by domestic
pro-democracy groups was the second objective of Chapter 3. These
criticisms were categorised in three distinct groups. The first related to the
perceived inconsistency in the application of democratic electoral standards.
In response to this criticism, it has been argued that there is no universal
standard by which the so-called 'freeness and fairness' of elections can be
judged. The author suggested that those observing elections are best advised
to determine whether basic democratic values have been adhered to within
the context that an election takes place. Newly democratised states can for
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example not be judged by the same stringent standards that are applied to
established democracies.
A second criticism levelled against the practice of international election
observation, is the uncoordinated way in which a number of observation
efforts have been conducted in the past. This transpired in the duplication of
services, conflicting pronouncements, and in some instances even into a
burden on local electoral authorities. Recent international election observation
efforts have indicated that observation is more resourceful when coordinated
by a central institution. This has also been suggested as the best way to
approach the South African observation effort. It not only allows for efficient
deployment and the sharing of information gathered in the field, but also
importantly, the saving of costs.
Another objection noted by local pro-democracy groups, has been the
perceived partiality with which some observers operate. Although international
observers are widely perceived to be impartial, the literature has indicated that
certain considerations have in the past clouded some of their judgements. For
this reason it has been suggested that closer cooperation between local
observer groups be established. The sharing of gathered information will
ensure that the findings of local and international observers do not contradict
one another. In this way the credibility of both groups will be enhanced.
Moreover, since international observation will not be a permanent feature of
elections, it is conceivable that at some stage the conduct of observation will
become the sole responsibility of local observers. It is therefore vital that less
experienced local observer missions be assisted by international experts in
both the methodology and technology involved in the conduct of observer
missions.
The suggestions made in Chapter 3 was carried over into Chapter 4 to
establish the extent to which they have become part of international observer
practice in South African elections. The 1994 and 1999 observation efforts
were dealt with separately, since the political and legislative context within
which each took place differed significantly.
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With regard to the first suggestion, it has been established that in both
elections a measure has been employed that takes account of basic
democratic values within the political context that the election takes place. It
has been contended that contextual factors played a decisive role in the
determination of the 1994 result. Although it cannot be contested that the
1994 result has reflected the 'will of the majority of South Africans' (the most
common measure used in both observation efforts), it is doubtful whether it
would have made the grade if the stakes weren't as big five years ago.
With the observer mandate in 1999 differing significantly from that of 1994, it
has not been easy to make a comparison between the coordination of the two
respective observer initiatives. In both efforts though the UN played a major
role. In 1994 it was responsible for the coordination of the major IGO, NGO
and governmental observer missions. In addition it also participated in the
practical observation effort with other organisations. Not all missions preferred
to fall under the UN umbrella. Electoral NGOs like the IFES, NDl and IRI
opted to conduct their observation efforts independently.
Conditions preceding the June 1999 elections were not nearly as volatile as
was the case in 1994. The mandate that the IEC entrusted foreign observers
with was therefore less comprehensive than the first time around. The effect
of the new, curtailed mandate, was that fewer observers were designated, for
a shorter period, to the 1999 election. The UN once again coordinated the
missions of the major IGOs and governmental delegations. This time it did
however not participate in the actual observation effort itself. The only major
IGO that conducted its observation effort outside the UN-Coordinated mission
was the Commonwealth. As was the case in 1994, the major international
NGO's once again chose to observe the process independently. Since most
of these groups (IFES, NDl, IRI, AWEPA) have established themselves in the
country since the country's first democratic election, they could draw on their
own experience and databases of the country.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
98
Matters pertaining to the third suggestion, closer cooperation between
national and international observers has shown little improvement. It was
indicated that cooperation between major international observer groups and
the largest national observer group, NEON, was largely lacking in 1994.
Unfortunately the same must be said of the 1999 observation effort.
Representatives of both national and international observer groups have
recognised the shortcoming. This aspect of election observation deserves
more attention in future discussions on the topic.
2. FINAL REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
It is unlikely that foreign election observation will in future playas important a
role as it has in our first two democratic elections. All indications are that the
scale of international observation - if at all - will be much smaller in future
elections. According to Tselane Mokuena, the lEG feels that the local capacity
cultivated in the course of South Africa's first five years of democracy, will play
an ever increasing role in South African observer efforts.192 She does,
however, not exclude the possibility of future international observer efforts.
One prominent electoral NGO has already indicated that it does not intend to
observe the next general election in 2004. Joe Baxter, South African
coordinator of IFES, contends that unless the political situation in South Africa
worsens dramatically over the next five years, 'it is pointless' to designate
another observer mission. He contends that were it not for the ORG observer
project, IFESwould not have sent observers to the 1999 elections either.
The future chances of large-scale cooperation between international and local
observer efforts thus seem to be limited. From observer accounts of the past
two observation efforts, it appears as if the opportunity to mutually benefit
from each other's capacities has, with the exception of a few instances, gone
waste. The burden therefore seems to rest largely on the shoulders of South
Africans to build and enhance their own observation capabilities. This, the
author suggests, would be the major challenge for future election observation
efforts in South Africa, and indeed for the whole Southern African region.
192 See interview with Tselane Mokuena, 1999
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It should not be assumed that local observer groups are generally less able
than their international peers. The capabilities to mount professional observer
efforts do exist in the country, as several observers have remarked. The need
however exists for the timely and efficient coordination of the available skills.
This aspect has been lacking in South Africa. Before each of the two
elections, large local observation coalitions were formed to provide a
comprehensive observer effort. Both of these endeavours were launched so
soon before the respective election days, that it could hardly be imagined that
training given to observers was sufficient. In 1994, training of NEON
observers continued until a day before polling. Similarly the 1999 recruitment
of observers by SACSOC only started 40 days before the election. It can
therefore be suggested that in order to extend professional conduct to all
observers, the groundwork, especially the training will have to be conducted
well in advance of Election Day. This will give coordinators the opportunity to
spend sufficient time on finer logistical aspects that might enhance the overall
effort. The ideal situation would be for such an observation organisation to be
a permanent fixture. The costs involved in maintaining an institution of this
nature will be too costly for South Africa's cash-strapped civil society
organisations.
A development that deserves encouragement is the regional initiative by
SADC to manage observation efforts within the region. Coordinated by EISA
in Johannesburg, the SADC Electoral Commission Forum's central aim is to
develop electoral capacity within the region. As has been indicated, the forum
will engage in democratic development initiatives, that includes election
observation in SADC. According to David Pottie, this initiative flows from a
growing realisation of the need to redefine expectations of international
observation.?" Indications are that in future a more cooperative approach will
be sought, in terms of which foreign assistance will be requested on the basis
of a needs assessment conducted by a host country. If the conduct of a
regional observation effort is going to be cheaper, Pottie suggests that a
193 See interview with David Pattie, 1999
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country might want to forego the expenses of an international observer
mission, and rather request the presence of a smaller technical team, or send
electoral administrators to management courses abroad. He contends that
this does not amount to a rejection of foreign observer missions such as that
of the UN or Commonwealth, but should be viewed as an attempt to address
matters pertaining to funding and how these resources should be spent.
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